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I. INTRODUCTION
A. History
Arbitration in the State of California has a long history. Originally gov-
erned by statute under Title 10, enacted in 1872,' arbitration in California has
undergone many changes. In 1955, the Uniform Law Commissioners promul-
gated the Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA"). 2 The UAA has been remarkably
successful. Forty-nine jurisdictions have arbitration statutes; thirty-five of these
have adopted the UAA and fourteen have adopted substantially similar legisla-
tion.' California adopted the UAA in 1961, repealing the obsolete Title 10 and
providing that the new and improved Title 9 govern arbitration. '
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, Malibu, California.
The assistance of Terence Dougherty, Alexis Ridenour, and Monet Nelson is gratefully acknowl-
edged. The author welcomes comments to this report at roger.alford@pepperdine.edu.
This report was prepared for the California Law Revision Commission by Prof. Roger Alford,
Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. No part of this report may be
published without prior written consent of the Commission.
The Law Revision Commission assumes no responsibility for any statement made in this
report, and no statement in this report is to be attributed to the Commission. The Commission's
action will be reflected in its own recommendation, which will be separate and distinct from this
report. The Commission should not be considered as having made a recommendation on a particular
subject until the final recommendation of the Commission on that subject has been submitted to the
Legislature.
1. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE tit. 9, § 3(West 2002) (Current through ch. 51 of 2002 Reg. Sess.
urgency legislation & ch. 3 of 3rd Ex.Sess. & March 5, 2002 election).
2. See UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/fnact
99/1920_69/uaa55.htm; (hereinafter "UAA") attached hereto as Appendix III.
3. See REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, (hereinafter "RUAA"), Prefatory Note (2000)
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/uarba/arbitratl2l3.htm , attached hereto as Ap-
pendix II.
4. Jevne v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 542, 549-50 (2003) (discussing history of Title 9)
The 1955 Uniform Arbitration Act as adopted in California accomplished
two things.5 First, the Act expressly countered the common law rule that parties
could not agree to arbitration before a dispute arose.6 Although parties have
always been free to arbitrate after disputes arose, common law rules prohibited
enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements.7 Second, the Uniform Arbi-
tration Act established basic rules to govern the conduct of arbitration proceed-
ings.'
The 1955 Uniform Arbitration Act, echoing the provisions of the 1925 Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, provided a general framework for California courts to en-
force arbitration-related disputes.9 As court dockets have filled over the years
and trials have become longer and more expensive, there has been a correspond-
ing increase in the number of parties agreeing to arbitrate their disputes.'" Since
the adoption of the UAA in 1961, California legislators have attempted to keep
pace with the increasing use of arbitration as an alternative to litigation. "
For example, although the 1955 UAA did not address the consolidation of
separate arbitration proceedings, California legislators amended the statute in
1978 to include such provisions.' 2 Section 1281.3 provides that a party to an
arbitration proceeding may petition the court to order a consolidation of separate
arbitration proceedings where the separate proceedings stem from a dispute
involving the same transaction and where there is a common issue of law or
fact.13 As a result of Section 1281.3, arbitration is more adaptable to widespread
use as an acceptable method of dispute resolution.
California has also kept pace in other ways. As originally enacted, the
UAA provided that a neutral arbitrator's bias permitted vacation of an award,
but the UAA did not require the disclosure of interests that might cause bias. 4
5. RUAA Summary (2000) available at http://nccusl.orglnccusl/uniformactsummaries/un-
iformacts-s-aa.asp.
6. Id.
7. For a recent summary of common law enforcement of arbitration prior to enactment of the
Federal Arbitration Act, see Michael H. Leroy & Peter Feuille, Judicial Enforcement of Predispute
Arbitration Agreements: Back to the Future, 18 Ohio State J. Dis. Res. 249, 259, 277 (2003).
8. Id.
9. RUAA, Policy Statement (2000) available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarbal
arbps0500.htm. (hereinafter "Policy Statement").
10. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.10(a) ("The Legislature finds and declares that litigation
involving small civil cases can be so costly and complex that efficiently resolving these civil cases is
difficult, and that the resulting delays and expenses may deny parties their right to a timely resolu-
tion of minor civil disputes. The Legislature further finds and declares that arbitration has proven to
be an efficient and equitable method for resolving small civil cases, and that courts should encourage
or require the use of arbitration for those actions whenever possible.")
11. Id.
12. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.3
13. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.3.
14. SeeUAA § 12(a).
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California responded in 1994 with Section 1281.9, and later amended it in 1997
and 2001 to specifically address that issue. 5 Currently, the statute requires a
proposed neutral arbitrator to disclose, among other things, any financial or
personal interests and any past or present relationships with the parties in-
volved.' 6
In 1988, California became one of the few states to adopt a statute on inter-
national arbitration, Section 1297, modeled on the UNCITRAL Model Law. '7
The following year, California enacted Section 1281.8, providing the court
with the power to grant provisional remedies to parties involved in an arbitration
proceeding. Consequently, one party could no longer postpone choosing an
arbitrator in an effort to nullify the benefits of any award the opposing party
might receive."
It is startling to note that despite attempts to reflect modern trends in dispute
resolution, the bulk of the statute has remained unchanged for more than three-
quarters of a century. "[The] UAA closely tracks the provisions of the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA") which was adopted in 1925. Neither the UAA nor
FAA have been amended since each were enacted. Therefore, for all practical
purposes, American arbitration statutes have not been revised over the past 75
years."'
19
B. General Description
The general purpose of arbitration law is to advance arbitration as an alter-
native to litigation. Arbitration is generally viewed as an attractive alternative to
litigation, affording parties with an economical, efficient, confidential, and neu-
tral forum to resolve their contractual disputes.
Arbitration is generally a faster means of resolving disputes than litigation.
Parties may bypass crowded court dockets, and instead may schedule an arbitra-
15. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.9.
16. Id.
17. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297 et. seq. The UNCITRAL Model Law is a proposed law
promulgated by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law for adoption by na-
tional and state legislatures. It embodies a comprehensive collection of modem, well-thought-
through solutions to issues that are prevalent in international commercial arbitration. JACK J. COE,
JR., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN A
GLOBAL CONTEXT, 88 & n.210 (1997).
18. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.8.
19. Policy Statement.
tion hearing at their own time and convenience. 2 Additionally, the informality
associated with an arbitration proceeding - minimal pleading, discovery, mo-
tion practice, and other pre-trial procedures - can dramatically reduce the time
to settlement or review the merits by an impartial tribunal. 2' The limited oppor-
tunity for appeal or court review has the same effect of favoring arbitration.22
Furthermore, parties may choose to appoint arbitrators with professional knowl-
edge of the matter being disputed, thus sparing the time and expense associated
with educating a judge or jury.23 A reduced trial time may translate into cost
savings as well.24 Other benefits to arbitration include fewer hostilities among
the parties as well as complete confidentiality. 25
The benefits and goals of arbitration law are reflected in the California stat-
ute. In most instances, the California statute recognizes the autonomy necessary
for these benefits to be conferred. For example, arbitration agreements are gen-
erally valid and enforceable except where there are legitimate contractual or
public policy grounds to refuse enforcement of the agreement. 26 In addition,
agreements providing for the selection of a particular arbitrator and those estab-
lishing the procedures for appointing an arbitrator are enforceable as well.27 The
court is allowed to step in only when all prior attempts to fulfill the agreements
fail. 28 Further, a party may elect to be represented by counsel, or may waive that
right.2 9
However, arbitration agreements and awards are not self-enforcing. Com-
pliance with an arbitration agreement may require judicial supervision to compel
arbitration.3 ° Judicial assistance during the arbitration process may also be re-
quired to enforce provisional orders, address challenges to an arbitrator, or assist
with discovery.3' After an award has been rendered, any party dissatisfied with
an arbitration award may petition the court to vacate the award.32 The court may
vacate, correct or modify the award, or require a rehearing in appropriate cir-
cumstances. 33 If the court decides to confirm the award, judgment is entered and
20. DAVID B. LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF CORPORATE
DISPUTES: A REPORT ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS 17, 26 (1998).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.
27. Id. at § 1281.6.
28. Id. at § 1281.2.
29. Id. at § 1282.4.
30. Id. at § 1281.2.
31. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1281.8, 1281.91, 1282.6.
32. Id. at § 1285.
33. Id. at §§ 1286.2, 1286.4, 1286.6, 1286.8, 1287.
[Vol. 4:1, 2003]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
the award is enforceable like any other court judgment.34 In this way, private
arbitration and the public judicial process are inextricably intertwined. For arbi-
tration to be effective, judicial supervision at the beginning, middle, and final
stages must be available.
C. Assumptions of the Report
Recommendations reflected in this report assume a legislative policy that is
friendly to arbitration and that desires to promote effective judicial assistance of
arbitration. From this general assumption arise a number of subsidiary assump-
tions that directly impact the recommendations in this report.
First, it is assumed that party autonomy should be a fundamental principle
that is respected, except in the face of clear overriding legislative priorities.
This assumption recognizes that the courts will not uphold arbitration agree-
ments that would violate public policy or in circumstances where mutual assent
is lacking. However, the judicial branch should generally promote the enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements and any resulting awards.
Second, these recommendations assume that parties choose arbitration as a
viable alternative to litigation, and they do so for well-recognized reasons
(speed, efficiency, lower cost, confidentiality, etc.). This choice reflects a pref-
erence for these benefits over the benefits inherent in traditional litigation. Leg-
islative initiatives that thwart the objectives reflected in this contractual choice -
such as non-waivable mandatory statutory requirements - should generally be
discouraged as they undermine the attractiveness of arbitration.
Third, these recommendations assume that the legislature seeks to avoid
preemption conflicts with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The Supreme
Court has articulated clear rules of preemption, and to the extent state law is
inconsistent with the FAA, it is unlikely that state law would prevail. Further-
more, resolving preemption issues would require additional litigation. This
assumption favors uniformity between state and federal law, absent a clear basis
justifying a lack of uniformity.
Fourth, these recommendations assume that uniformity of laws is desirable
in arbitration. The legislature has demonstrated a commitment to uniformity in
the adoption of the Uniform Arbitration Act in 1961, the UNCITRAL Model
Law in 1988, and uniform contractual laws such as the Uniform Commercial
Code. Therefore, it is presumed that a preference exists for the Revised Uni-
34. Id. at § 1286.
form Arbitration Act ("RUAA") wherever possible. Although only enacted in
2000, it already appears likely that the RUAA will be the basis for uniformity of
state arbitration laws. The RUAA has been approved by the American Bar As-
sociation and endorsed by the American Arbitration Association. It also has
been adopted in Hawaii, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oregon and Utah, and has been introduced in at least eleven
states.
35
Finally, these recommendations assume that the revisions embodied in the
RUAA reflect solutions to address major developments in arbitration. Although
the California statute has not been subject to significant revision since 1961,
there have been significant developments in arbitration law since that time, and
the RUAA attempts to incorporate and address those issues. Where California
has adopted recent amendments to the arbitration statute, it is assumed that the
legislature did so to address specific areas of concern and, if necessary, depart
from a uniform standard to address those concerns.
As a result, this report recommends adoption of the RUAA with modifica-
tions. This approach attempts to reconcile, coordinate, and supplement the
RUAA with existing provisions of California law. These recommendations are
set forth in detail below.
II. CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1280 of the California Arbitration Statute provides definitions for
six terms: "Agreement", "Award", "Controversy", "Neutral arbitrator", "Party
to the arbitration", and "Written agreement".
36
Consistent with the UAA, the overwhelming majority of states do not have
a definition section in their arbitration statutes.
37
Section 1 of the RUAA includes definitions for six terms: "Arbitration or-
ganization", "Arbitrator", "Court", "Knowledge", "Person", "Record".38 With
one exception, the RUAA terms are separate from and not inconsistent with the
definitions provided in Section 1280 of the California statute.
The one potential inconsistency pertains to "Record." The RUAA's use of
the term "Record" is a significant improvement over Section 1280(f)'s reference
to a "Written agreement."39 As the RUAA comments indicate, "Record" better
accommodates "the use of electronic evidence in business and governmental
35. See A FEw FACTS ABOUT THE UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT (2000) available at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-aa.asp.
36. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280.
37. Of the states that have not adopted the RUAA, only a few states, such as California, Utah,
and Maryland, have a definition section in their arbitration statues.
38. RUAA § I, available at http://www.law.upenn.edullibrary/ulc/uarba/arbitratl213.htm.
39. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280(f).
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transactions", although it is not meant to imply that the term "written" used
elsewhere "may not be given equally broad interpretation".' The definition of
record is identical to the definition of record in the Uniform Commercial Code,
Section 5-102(a)(14).4 It is recommended that the current definitions in Section
1280 be incorporated into and made part of Section 1 of the RUAA. The defini-
tion for "written agreement" should be modified to incorporate a Record.
Section 2 of the RUAA concerns Notice.42 The notice provision is based on
terminology reflected in the Uniform Commercial Code (California Commercial
Code, section 1-201(25)).41
Section 3 of the RUAA concerns the effective date of the Act.44 The provi-
sion provides that the act governs an agreement made on or after the effective
date of the act, or an agreement to arbitrate made before the act, if all the parties
so agree. It also provides for retroactive application in Section 3(c), after a de-
layed date for all contracts whenever made, presumably several years following
the adoption of the act.45 This approach allows for prospective application for
future contracts as of the effective date under Sections 3(a) and 3(b), and retro-
active application for all other contracts after a further period of time. The ap-
proach is outlined in some detail in the comments to the RUAA 6.4 It is notewor-
thy that the California statute did not adopt Section 20 of the Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act, which provides only for prospective application of the act. A new
provision of Section 3 should be included.
Section 1280.2 of the California Arbitration Statute includes a provision on
reference to statutes.47 There is no comparable provision in the RUAA.
Recommendation: The definitions in Section 1280 should be retained and
incorporated into Section 1 of the RUAA. The proposed section 1 would in-
clude eleven definitions, six from Section 1280 and six from the Section 1 of the
RUAA. The definition for "written agreement" should be modified to read,
"Written agreement shall be deemed to include a Record or a written agreement
which has been extended or renewed by an oral or implied agreement." Sec-
tions 2 and 3 of the RUAA should be adopted. Section 3(c) should include a
delayed date for retroactive application that is four years after the effective date
40. RUAA§ 1,cmt. 5.
41. Id.
42. Id. § 2.
43. Id., cmt. 1.
44. Id. §3.
45. Id. § 3(c).
46. Id., cmt. 4.
47. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280.2.
identified in section 3(a) and 3(b). Section 1280.2 should be retained and incor-
porated into a new Section 3(d) of the RUAA. The title to the new Section 3
should be revised to read "When Act Applies; Reference to Statute."
Il. CHAPTER 2 - ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The RUAA also has important provisions relating to party autonomy and
mandatory rules. As noted above, party autonomy should form the basis of
arbitration and the rules reflected in California law should promote that auton-
omy. The RUAA supports this position in Section 4(a). It provides that
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c), a party to an agree-
ment to arbitrate or to an arbitration proceeding may waive or, the parties may
vary the effect of, the requirements of this [Act] to the extent permitted by
law., 48 The RUAA also identifies in section 4(b) statutory provisions that may
not be prospectively waived.49 This section does not apply to agreements to
arbitrate after a dispute has arisen.' ° Neither the UAA nor the California statute
contains similar provisions, although section 4(a) is consistent with California
common law. Section 4(b) finds no corollary in California law. Section 4(b) is
significant as a limitation on party autonomy, but does not wholly compromise
that autonomy to the extent the parties address such matters after a dispute has
arisen.5
Section 1281 of the California Arbitration Statute provides the basic rule
that a "written agreement to submit to arbitration . . . is valid, enforceable and
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any con-
tract.""2 This is based on Section 1 of the UAA, which in turn is based on Sec-
tion 2 of the FAA.53 The RUAA also incorporates this general rule, but includes
significant clarifications in the remaining provisions of Section 6. Section 6(b)
codifies two general rules. First, Section 6(b) codifies the general rule that "is-
sues of substantive arbitrability, i.e., whether a dispute is encompassed by an
agreement to arbitrate, are for a court to decide. 54 Section 6(b) also codifies that
rule that "issues of procedural arbitrability, i.e., whether prerequisites such as
time limits, notice, laches, estoppel, and other conditions precedent to an obliga-
48. RUAA § 4(a).
49. Id. § 4(b).
50. Id., cmt. 4.
51. RUAA § 4, cmt. 4.
52. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.
53. See RUAA § 6, cmt. 1. Section 6(a) of the RUAA incorporates this general rule as well.
("The language in Section 6(a) as to the validity of arbitration agreements is the same as UAA Sec-
tion 1 and almost the same as the language of FAA Section 2 which states that arbitration agree-
ments 'shall be valid irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."').
54. Id., cmt. 2.
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tion to arbitrate have been met, are for the arbitrators to decide."55 Section 6(c)
is consistent with the common law understandings applying the FAA.56 Accord-
ingly, absent allegations that the arbitration clause was induced by fraud, "chal-
lenges to the enforceability of the underlying contract on grounds such as fraud,
illegality, mutual mistake, duress, unconscionability and the like are to be de-
cided by the arbitrator." This approach has been adopted in California as well. 7
Significantly, the proposed Section 6(b) and (c) are default rules that can be
waived under Section 4(a).58 Many arbitration rules, including the AAA Rules,
provide for the arbitrator to "determine the existence or validity of a contract of
which an arbitration clause forms a part."59 RUAA's approach of codifying the
arbitrability and separability doctrines, subject to contractual modification, is
helpful and should be incorporated into California's statutory regime.
Section 6(d) incorporates a statutory provision consistent with the rules of
most arbitration organizations, including the American Arbitration Association,
to permit arbitrators to proceed pending final decision by the court, unless oth-
erwise specified by the court.6°
On the matter of compelling arbitration, Section 1281.2 specifies that upon
motion a court shall order arbitration if it determines that an agreement to arbi-
trate exists, unless (1) the right to compel arbitration was waived; (2) grounds
for revocation of the agreement exists; or (3) a party to the arbitration agreement
is also a party to a pending court action and there is a possibility of conflicting
judgments. 6' Denial of a petition on other grounds is reversible error.62 In addi-
tion, under 1281.2, a court may delay the order to arbitrate if there are other
55. Id.
56. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); See First Op-
tions of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Erickson, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney &
Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak St., 673 P.2d 251 (1983); Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d
1061 (1996).
57. Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Sec. Corp. 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875,888-89 (1996).
58. RUAA § 6, cmt. 2. Furthermore, most states that have not adopted the RUAA do not
specify which rights may be waived by parties to an arbitration.
59. AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, R-7 (effective
July 1, 2003), available at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15747&JSPsrc=uploadLlVE-
SITE\Rules-Prcedures\National-Internationa\.\f.ocusArea\comunercialAAA235current.htm.
60. See RUAA § 6, cmt. 6.
61. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2.
62. Valsan Partners Ltd P'ship v. Calcor Space Facility, Inc., 25 Cal. App.4th 809, 817
(1994).
issues not subject to arbitration which are the subject of pending action between
the parties.63
Section 1281.4 addresses motions to stay litigation.' If an order compel-
ling arbitration has been issued, a court shall, upon motion, stay any pending
court action until arbitration is had in accordance with the arbitration agreement.
If an order compelling arbitration has been sought but not yet issued, a court
shall, upon motion, stay pending court action until the application for an order
compelling arbitration has been determined.
Finally, Section 1281.2 has special provisions with respect to compelling
arbitration and third party litigation.65 If a court determines that a party to an
arbitration agreement is also a party to pending litigation with a third party, it (1)
may refuse to order arbitration and order intervention or joinder of all parties in
a single action for all or certain issues; (2) may order arbitration among the par-
ties who agreed to arbitrate and stay pending court action; (3) may stay arbitra-
tion among the parties who agreed to arbitrate pending the outcome of court
action. 66 This permits courts to refuse enforcement of an otherwise valid arbitra-
tion agreement in order to join all relevant parties in litigation.67 Under 1281.2,
determinations as to the existence of an arbitration agreement, and waiver
thereof, are made by the court without a jury trial.68 Waiver of an arbitration
agreement may be express or implied, but the presumption favoring arbitration
places a heavy burden on a party arguing such a right has been waived.6 9
The California statute is unusual in the latitude it grants the court to compel
arbitration, and to stay both judicial proceedings and pending arbitration hear-
ings. Although the majority of states allow the court to stay arbitration and judi-
cial proceedings, those states require that the proceedings be severed and the
stay granted as to a particular issue. 70 Under Section 1281, there is no severabil-
63. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(c).
64. Id. § 1281.4.
65. Id. § 1281.2(c)(i)-(3).
66. Id.
67. Mercury Ins. Group. v. Sup. Ct., 19 Cal. 4th 332, 339-40 (1998); Prudential Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct., 36 Cal. App. 4th 275, 279 (1995).
68. Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Sec. Corp., 14 Cal. 4th 394, 410 (1996); Engalla v. Per-
manente Med. Group, Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 951,982 (1997).
69. Thorup v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 180 Cal. App. 3d 228, 234 (1986); Davis v. Blue
Cross of N. Cal., 25 Cal. 3d 418, 425 (1979); Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 791 F.2d 691, 694
(1986).
70. For example, in Florida the court has the ability to stay or compel an arbitration proceed-
ing. If, however the issue is severable, then the arbitration proceeding is stayed as to that issue only.
There is no provision for the courts ability to stay an existing judicial proceeding. In Massachusetts,
New York, Pennsylvania, Texas and the District of Columbia, a court may compel or stay arbitration
as well a stay a court proceeding. If the issue is severable then the proceeding is stayed as to that
issue only.
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ity requirement, thus allowing the court to compel or stay proceedings as to a
particular issue or to all issues.
Section 7 of the RUAA is notably different from Sections 1281.2 and
1281.4. There are several distinctions worthy of mention. First, Section 1281.2
provides enumerated grounds for refusing to order arbitration.7 Under the
RUAA, the only express limitation on an order to compel arbitration is a sum-
mary finding that there is an "enforceable agreement to arbitrate. '72 This lan-
guage may limit orders compelling arbitration in any instance in which the
agreement cannot be enforced, including 1281.2's reference to waiver and revo-
cation. Unlike 1281.2, Section 7 provides no authority to refuse to order arbitra-
tion because of pending third party litigation.73
Second, Section 7 expressly excludes certain defenses to orders compelling
arbitration. These include contentions that the claim subject to arbitration lacks
merit or the grounds for the claim have not been established. 74 This is similar,
but broader than Section 1281.2, which provides that an order to arbitrate cannot
be refused because the "petitioner's contentions lack substantive merit.
75
Third, Section 7 makes no reference to third party litigation. While 1281.2
grants the court significant discretion in how to proceed in the event of third
party litigation, Section 7 ignores third party litigation altogether.76 Under the
RUAA, the fact that a party is involved in litigation with a third party has no
bearing on the obligation of the court to order arbitration pursuant to an enforce-
71, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(a)-(c).
72. RUAA § 7(a)(2).
73. Compare RUAA § 7(a)(2) with CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(a)-(c). The RUAA
provides that "on [motion] of a person showing an agreement to arbitrate and alleging another per-
son's refusal to arbitrate pursuant to the agreement ... if the refusing party opposes the [motion], the
court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue and order the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that
there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate." On the other hand, Section 1281.2 states that a court
is not required to enforce an arbitration agreement when the right to compel arbitration has been
waived, the arbitration agreement should be revoked, or a party to the arbitration is also a party to a
pending court action.
74. RUAA § 7(d) "The court may not refuse to order arbitration because the claim subject to
arbitration lacks merit or grounds for the claim have not been established."
75. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2.
76. Under Section 1281.2, if a party to an arbitration is also involved in third-party litigation,
the court "(I) may refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement and may order intervention or joinder
of all parties in a single action or special proceeding; (2) may order intervention or joinder as to all
or only certain issues; (3) may order arbitration among the parties who have agreed to arbitration and
stay the pending court action or special proceeding pending the outcome of the arbitration proceed-
ing; or (4) may stay arbitration pending the outcome of the court action or special proceeding."
able arbitration agreement. This is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act.77
The distinction suggests that 1281.2 reflects greater concern for efficient proc-
ess, while Section 7 reflects greater concern for fidelity to the parties' binding
obligations to arbitrate. Adoption of Section 7 will bring California law into line
with federal law.78
Fourth, Section 7 provides significant guidance regarding the process for is-
suing orders to arbitrate. If the motion to compel arbitration is opposed, the
court shall proceed "summarily" to decide the issue and order arbitration unless
it finds there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate. 79 The comment to section
7 of the RUAA states that the term "summarily" has been defined to mean that a
trial court should act expeditiously and without a jury trial.8" This is consistent
with California law. In addition, if the refusing party does not appear, or does
not oppose the motion, the court shall compel arbitration with any summary
determination regarding the existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement.
8
Finally, Section 7 limits the venue for seeking a motion to compel arbitration to
the situs of pending court litigation, or in the absence thereof, pursuant to the
venue provisions of Section 27.82 Section 1281.4 has no such venue limitations
on motions to compel arbitration where court litigation is pending.83
Fifth, section 1281.4 grants greater discretion to the court in issuing orders
to stay pending litigation. That section authorizes a court to stay litigation
where an order compelling arbitration has been issued "until an arbitration has
been had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as
the court specifies."'  By contrast, Section 7 of the RUAA requires a stay "on
just terms" without an express temporal limitation.85 Section 1281.4 and Section
7 similarly obligate a court to stay litigation where an order compelling arbitra-
77. Similarly, the Federal Arbitration Act does not mention third-party litigation when ad-
dressing a court's ability to compel arbitration. FAA § 4. "The court shall hear the parties, and upon
being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is
not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accor-
dance with the terms of the agreement."
78. Although the California courts have yet to officially recognize the preemption conflict that
exists between Section 1281.2 and the FAA, the court has ruled in an unpublished opinion that this
provision of the California arbitration statute has been preempted. Film Fins., Inc. v. Sup. Ct., 2002
WL 228205 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist.).
79. RUAA § 7(a)(2).
80. Id., cmt.
81. RUAA § 7(a)(l).
82. Id. at § 7(e).
83. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.4.
84. Id.
85. RUAA § 7(f) ("If a party makes a [motion] to the court to order arbitration, the court on
just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim alleged to be subject to the arbitra-
tion until the court renders a final decision under this section.").
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tion has been issued, or where an application for an order to compel arbitration
is pending.86
Regarding provisional remedies, Section 1281.8 provides a detailed mecha-
nism for provisional measures.87 This section specifies (1) the four types of
remedies available for provisional relief;8 8 (2) the place, manner and form for
requesting provisional relief;89 (3) limitations on defending against provisional
relief based on an allegation that the controversy is not subject to arbitration;9'
and (4) limitations on effect of provisional measures to operate as a waiver.9'
California courts have applied 1281.8 to grant provisional relief for disputes that
will ultimately be resolved by arbitration.92
Section 8 of the RUAA on provisional remedies applies a broader scope
than 1281.8 for court orders of provisional remedies prior to appointment of an
arbitrator. Unlike 1281.8(a), Section 8 does not specifically enumerate the types
of remedies available for provisional relief, stating that any remedy is available
if it "protects the effectiveness of the arbitration proceeding to the same extent
and under the same conditions as if the controversy were the subject of a civil
action." 93 The absence of such enumerated grounds for provisional relief will
afford courts greater freedom to ensure the effectiveness of the arbitral process.
The RUAA also clarifies the basis for provisional relief in court following
the appointment of an arbitrator. Section 1281.8 makes no distinction between
86. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC CODE § 1281.4 ("If a court of competent jurisdiction ... has
ordered arbitration of a controversy... the court ... shall, upon motion of a party... stay the action
or proceeding .... If an application has been made to a court of competent jurisdiction ... for an
order to arbitrate a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before
a court ... the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a
party...stay the action or proceeding ....") with RUAA § 7(f) ("If a party makes a [motion] to the
court to order arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a
claim alleged to be subject to the arbitration until the court renders a final decision under this sec-
tion.") and RUAA § 7(g) ("If the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any
judicial proceeding that involves a claim subject to the arbitration. If a claim subject to the arbitra-
tion is severable, the court may limit the stay to that claim.").
87. California is in a minority of states that allows for provisional remedies, including Con-
necticut, Georgia, New Jersey, New York, and Texas.
88. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.8(a)(l)-(4).
89. Id. at § 1281.8(b)
90. Id. at § 1281.8(c).
91. Id. at § 1281.8 (d).
92. See Davenport v. Blue Cross of CA, 641 Cal. App. 4th (1994); see also Titan/Value Equi-
ties Group, Inc. v. Sup. Ct., 29 Cal. App. 4th 482 (1994).
93. RUAA § 8(a).
seeking provisional relief before or after appointment of an arbitrator.94 Pro-
vided the arbitration award may be rendered ineffectual without provisional
relief, a court may grant provisional relief before or after commencement of an
arbitration proceeding. By contrast, Section 8 authorizes a court to act prior to
appointment of an arbitrator if such an order would protect the effectiveness of
the arbitration proceeding. However, following the appointment of an arbitrator,
a court may only act if "the matter is urgent and the arbitrator is not able to act
timely or the arbitrator cannot provide an adequate remedy." 95 The urgency
requirement protects the integrity of the arbitral process from unnecessary judi-
cial action after the arbitrator's have been appointed.
Unlike Section 1281.8, the RUAA also grants statutory authority for an ar-
bitrator to provide provisional remedies. By authorizing the arbitrator to issue
such provisional remedies "to the same extent and under the same conditions as
if the controversy were the subject of a civil action," the RUAA has significantly
enhanced the authority of the arbitrator to protect the effectiveness of the arbitral
process. This enhanced authority granted to arbitrators is complementary and
necessitates the diminished authority granted to the court to order provisional
remedies following appointment of an arbitrator.
The RUAA goes further than Section 1281.8(d) in protecting against
waiver. Section 1281.8(d) limits the possibility that a provisional remedy appli-
cation will operate as a waiver provided the application for provisional relief is
accompanied by a motion to stay all other court proceedings. 96 This suggests
that such an application may operate as a waiver in the absence of such an ac-
companying request for a stay. The RUAA has no such limitation, stating that a
party does not waive a right of arbitration by applying for provisional relief.
The RUAA anticipates that an application for provisional relief may be appro-
priate without recourse to an application to compel or stay arbitration.
The RUAA also differs from Section 1281.8 in that the RUAA does not in-
clude any reference to defenses to an application for provisional relief. Section
1281.8 states that a claim that the controversy is not subject to arbitration shall
not be grounds for denial of any provisional remedy.97 However, the failure in
Section 8 to include such a provision does not imply that such a defense should
be effective to deny provisional relief. In fact, the RUAA does address such a
defense that there is no agreement to arbitrate in Section 7. Section 7(a) and (b)
94. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.8(b) ("A party, to an arbitration proceeding agreement,
may file in the court in the county in which an arbitration proceeding is pending, or if an arbitration
proceeding has not commenced, in any proper court, an application for a provisional remedy...").
95. RUAA § 8(b)(2).
96. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.8(d)
97. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.8(c) ("A claim by the party opposing issuance of a provi-
sional remedy, that the controversy is not subject to arbitration shall not be grounds for denial of any
provisional remedy.").
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requires a court, upon a motion of a party alleging there is - or in the case of
7(b) that there is not - an agreement to arbitrate, to "proceed summarily to
decide the issue."98 Under Section 7(c), if the court finds that there is no en-
forceable agreement, it may not order the parties to arbitrate under Section 7(a)
or (b).99 The requirement for summary decision in Section 7(a) and (b) suggests
that the absence of such a procedure in Section 8 renders ineffective such a de-
fense for purposes of securing provisional relief, at least until such time as a
court renders a Section 7 decision on the validity of an arbitration agreement.
The California statute has no provision for the initiation of arbitration. This
is consistent with the UAA and most other state arbitration laws."°° However,
California common law recognizes that due process requires that a party against
whom an award is sought be named in the demand and served with a copy of the
demand. 10' The requirements for the initiation of arbitration generally have been
addressed by contract through the incorporation of arbitration rules.0 2
Section 9 of the RUAA addresses three key aspects concerning the initiation
of arbitration: the means of notice03 , the content of the notice1°4, and the waiver
of objection to notice. 5 Section 9 specifies strict rules for providing notice in
the absence of agreement. However, the right to specify the rules on the initia-
tion of arbitration are protected by virtue of Section 9(a), which provide that
notice shall be given to the other parties to the agreement "in the agreed man-
ner.'1°6 In addition, Section 4(b)(2) provides that "[b]efore a controversy arises
that is subject to an agreement to arbitrate, a party to the agreement may not...
agree to unreasonably restrict the right under Section 9 to notice of the initiation
of an arbitration proceeding."'0 7 This provision will allow for notice of arbitra-
98. RUAA § 7 (a) ("On [motion] of a person showing an agreement to arbitrate and alleging
another person's refusal to arbitrate pursuant to the agreement... if the refusing party opposes the
[motion], the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue..."); Id. at § 7(b) ("On [motion] of a
person alleging that an arbitration proceeding has been initiatied or threatended but that there is no
agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue.").
99. Id. at § 7(c).
100. See RUAA § 9, cmt. 1. This section, which provides for the initiation of arbitration, was
an addition to the UAA. It was based primarily on the Florida and Indiana arbitration statutes. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 648.08 (1990); IND. CODE. § 34-57-2-2 (1998).
101. Ikerd v. Warren T. Merrill & Sons, 9 Cal. App. 4th 1833, 1842 (1992).
102. See AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, Rule R-4(a); R-41.
103. RUAA § 9(a).
104. Id.
105. Id. at § 9(b).
106. Id. at § 9(a).
107. RUAA § 4(b); RUAA § 9, cmt. 2.
tion by contractual agreement using informal means, including regular mail and
electronic mail.
Significantly, Section 9 requires notice to be given to all parties to the
agreement to arbitrate, not simply all parties to the dispute." 8 This approach
gives notice to all parties interested in the arbitration who may have an interest
in initiating arbitration or consolidation, whether or not they are claimants or
defendants in the particular dispute."t0 The content of the notice of arbitration is
limited to the nature of the controversy and the remedy sought."' The RUAA
reflects the minimum statutory requirements necessary to provide the defendant
notice of the arbitration.
Section 1281.3 addresses the consolidation of arbitration proceedings."'
The essential requirements for consolidation are (1) separate arbitration agree-
ments with one or more common parties; (2) the dispute arises from the same
transaction; and (3) there is a common issue of law or fact that might create
conflicting rulings. 1 2 California is at the forefront in providing a statutory re-
gime for consolidation." 3
Section 10 is an adaptation of the consolidation provisions in the California
and Georgia statutes. "'4 Section 10(a)(4) adds an additional threshold require-
ment that "prejudice resulting from a failure to consolidate is not outweighed by
the risk of undue delay or prejudice to the rights of ... parties opposing consoli-
dation."'  The purpose of this additional requirement is to recognize that par-
ties opposing consolidation have the right to prove that consolidation would
undermine their stated expectations, especially regarding delay or arbitrator
selection procedures." 6 This change appears consistent with California common
law."' It is therefore recommended that 1281.3 be repealed and replaced with
Section 10.
Section 1281.9 imposes strict requirements on disclosure of "all matters that
could cause a person ... to reasonably entertain a doubt that the proposed neutral
108. RUAA § 9(a).
109. Id. at § 9, cmt. 4.
110. Id. at § 9, cmt. 5. "Section 9(a) also includes a content requirement that the initiating
party inf the other parties of the 'nature of the controversy and the remedy sought." This require-
ment is similar to the language found in the Florida and Indiana arbitration statutes, as well as the
AAA and NYSE rules.
111. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.3.
112. Id.
113. Currently only Massachusetts, New Jersey, California and Georgia include provisions on
consolidation and severance of proceedings. California is unique, however, in that it includes rules
on determining an arbitrator after consolidation. See id.
114. RUAA,§ 10cmt. 3.
115. RUAA, § 10(a)(1)(4).
116. RUAA,§ 10cmt. 3.
117. Blue Cross of Ca. v. Sup. Ct., 67 Cal. App. 4th 42, 53-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1998).
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arbitrator would be able to be impartial..." ' California has among the most
stringent disclosure requirements of any state. In particular, California is con-
sidered more stringent because the level and detail of disclosure required of
arbitrators is unusual in scope. For example, Section 12(a) of the RUAA re-
quires disclosure of "any known facts that a reasonable person would consider
likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator," including financial or personal
interests and existing or past relationships with any party."9 By contrast, Sec-
tion 1281.9 enumerates in detail six types of information that must be disclosed,
some of which are extremely tenuous to the matter in dispute. 2 ° A good sum-
mary of the disclosure rules is set forth in Michael v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins.
co.
121
There are distinct advantages and disadvantages to California's stringent
approach. The integrity of the process is enhanced by having strict standards
and reducing instances of improper conduct between the neutral arbitrator and a
party. On the other hand, the stringent requirements are beyond the scope of
most other arbitral forums, suggesting a hostility toward arbitration and dimin-
ishing California as an attractive venue for arbitration. 2 In addition, to the
extent California law conflicts with federal law, there will be significant pre-
emption issues.123 Significant unintended consequences have developed as a
result of these disclosure requirements. 24 It is recommended that California
revisit the disclosure requirements and modify them to address some of the per-
ceived excesses created by the California regime.
California law also includes several provisions that address unique prob-
lems with consumer arbitration, construction arbitration, and private arbitration
companies. 25 These provisions all reflect strong legislative commitment to curb
abuses in the consumer and residential construction context. 126 Section 1281.92
118. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1281.9(a).
119. RUAA§ 12.
120. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.9(a)(1)-(6); see Jay Folberg, Arbitration Ethics - Is Cali-
fornia the Future?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 343, 349-57 (2003).
121. 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 240, 249-51.
122. See, e.g., NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council of Ca., 232 F. Supp. 2d
1055, 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
123. See generally Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal.
2003).
124. Folberg, supra note 120, at 352-53.
125. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1281.92, 1281.95, 1281.96 (2003).
126. "As with the other bills focused on private judging companies, this bill is designed to deter
actual or perceived misconduct by private judging companies, and promote independence and neu-
trality in consumer arbitrations." ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS ON A.B. 2574, 2001-2002 Session
(August 29, 2002).
prohibits private arbitration companies from administering consumer arbitration
services if the company has a financial interest in any party.'27 Section 1281.95
addresses disclosure requirements in residential construction arbitration.'28 Sec-
tion 1281.96 imposes additional disclosure and disqualification requirements.
129
All of these provisions reflect legislative concern about matters of special im-
port, and it is recommended that these provisions be retained without modifica-
tion.
Recommendation: Section 4 of the RUAA should be adopted without
modification. Section 1281 should be repealed and Section 6 should be adopted
without modification. It is recommended that Sections 1281.2 and 1281.4 be
repealed and that RUAA Section 7 be adopted without modification. Section
1281.8 should be repealed and Section 8 should be adopted without modifica-
tion. Section 9 of the RUAA should be adopted. Section 1281.3 should be re-
pealed and Section 10 of the RUAA should be adopted. Section 1281.8 should
be revised and modified in light of Section 12 of the RUAA as well as the cur-
rent experience in applying the disclosure requirements. Section 1281.92
through 1281.96 should be retained without modification.
IV. CHAPTER 3 - CONDUCT OF ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
Section 1282 provides detailed rules for the exercise of powers and duties
of arbitrators. Section 1282 should be read in conjunction with Section 1281.6.
Section 1282.2 addresses arbitration hearings and, unless the arbitration
agreement provides otherwise, imposes six essential obligations. First, it pro-
vides that the neutral arbitrator shall schedule a hearing and provide notice to the
parties of the hearing.' 3 ° In the event the amount in dispute exceeds $50,000,
parties are entitled in advance of the hearing to witness and document lists.'3 '
Second, it empowers the neutral arbitrator to adjourn or postpone the hearing.1 2
Third, it empowers the neutral arbitrator to preside at the hearing."' Fourth, it
entitles parties to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses."' Fifth, it
authorizes the neutral arbitrator to resolve a dispute in the absence of a party or
an arbitrator.'35 Sixth, it obligates a neutral arbitrator to disclose information that
forms the basis of the award and was not obtained at the hearing. 136
127. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.92.
128. Id. at § 1281.95.
129. Id. at § 1281.96.
130. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.2(a)(1).
131. Id. at § 1282.2(a)(2)(A).
132. Id. at § 1282.2(a)(2)(F)(b).
133. Id. at § 1282.2(a)(2)(F)(c).
134. Id. at § 1282.2(a)(2)(F)(d).
135. Id. at § 1282.2(a)(2)(F)(e).
136. Id. at 1282.2(a)(2)(F)(g).
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The RUAA is notably different from Section 1282.2. Most importantly, it
provides the arbitrator with general discretion to "conduct an arbitration in such
manner as the arbitrator considers appropriate."' 37 This reflects a fundamentally
different policy choice from Section 1282.2, which imposes strict requirements
on the arbitrator relating to the arbitration process. The RUAA, like the UAA
and most state statutes, is intended to give an arbitrator wide latitude in conduct-
ing an arbitration proceeding.
Under Section 15(b) of the RUAA, an arbitrator may decide to resolve a
dispute based on "summary disposition" without holding a hearing.'1 8 Section
1282.2 does not require a formal hearing, with courts holding that this provision
should not be read "as requiring that an arbitrator always resolve disputes
through the oral presentation of evidence or the taking of live testimony. ' '139
Thus, Section 1282.2 may permit summary dispositions without a hearing.
Section 15 of the RUAA and Section 1282.2 vary in important respects.
For example, if the arbitrator decides to hold a hearing, under Section 15(c) of
the RUAA, notice must be provided within five days. 4 ° Section 15 imposes no
obligation for advance notification of witness and document lists. Unlike Sec-
tion 1282.2(0, Section 15(e) does not permit truncated arbitral tribunals, requir-
ing any arbitrator who is unable to act to be replaced.' 4' In this respect, Califor-
nia is out of line with the other states, which generally allow for truncated arbi-
tral tribunals to decide a case.
There are, however, areas in which the RUAA and Section 1282.2 parallel
one another. Most significantly, both Section 1282.2 and Section 15 are default
137. RUAA § 15(a).
138. RUAA § 15(b)(1)-(2). An arbitrator may rule on summary disposition without a hearing
if all the parties agree, or if there is proper notice given to the opposing party and that party has an
opportunity to respond.
139. Schlessinger v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 656 (Cal. App. Ct. 2d
1995); see also Reed v. Mutual Service Corp., 131 Cal. Rptr.2d 524, 530 (Cal. App. Ct. 2d 2003)
("implicit in the arbitrators' express power to deem a claim eligible for arbitration is the correspond-
ing authority to make that determination in advance of and without the necessity for a full hearing on
the merits."); Lewis v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85, 97 (1999) ("California courts have con-
cluded that use of the terms 'heard' and 'hearing' does not require an opportunity for an oral presen-
tation, unless the context or other language indicates a contrary intent.").
140. RUAA § 15(c) ("If an arbitrator orders a hearing, the arbitrator.. shall.. .give notice of the
hearing not less than five days before the hearing begins.").
141. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.2(0 ("If an arbitrator.. .for any reason fails to participate in
the arbitration, the arbitration shall continue but only the remaining neutral arbitrator[s] may make
the award."). Compare with RUAA § 15(e) ("If an arbitrator ceases or is unable to act during the
arbitration proceeding, a replacement arbitrator must be appointed...").
procedures and are subject to modification by agreement of the parties.14 2 Re-
garding specific elements of the arbitration proceeding, Section 1282.2(b) and
(e) parallel Section 15(c), while Section 1282.2(d) parallels Section 15(d). 143 In
these provisions, there are no significant differences between the RUAA and
Section 1282.2.
The statutory requirements pertaining to the conduct of hearings in Section
1282.2 are unusually detailed and find no corollary in other states. '4 In most
states, parties are sufficiently protected from arbitrator misconduct by virtue of
the vacatur rules, which authorize an award to be vacated if a party's rights were
substantially prejudiced as a result of how the arbitration was conducted such
that the proceeding was fundamentally unfair. 1
45
In sum, with regard to the conduct of the arbitration hearing, it is recom-
mended that Section 1282.2 should be repealed and replaced with Section 15 of
the RUAA. The California provision expresses a fundamental reluctance to
grant the arbitrators leeway in how an arbitration proceeding is conducted, an
approach that is antithetical to the basic pro-arbitration policies that otherwise
adumbrates arbitration law in California. Moreover, California courts have in-
terpreted Section 1282.2 as to substantially eliminate the requirement of a for-
mal hearing, thus limiting the utility of this provision.
As to representation by counsel, Section 1282.4 is one of the most impor-
tant provisions in California arbitration law, limiting the ability of out-of-state
attorneys to represent parties involved in arbitration in California. The provision
has its origins in the California Supreme Court's decision in Birbrower v. Supe-
rior Court 46 . In that case, the court ruled that a lawyer engaged in the unauthor-
ized practice of law in California when he, inter alia, "traveled to California to
initiate arbitration proceedings."' The court declined to create an exception for
work incidental to private arbitration or other alternative dispute resolution pro-
142. Section 1282.2 ("Unless the arbitration agreement otherwise provides..."); RUAA § 15,
cmt. 1 ("Section 15 [of the RUAA] is a default provision and Section 4(a) is subject to agreement of
the parties).
143. Section 1282.2 (b) and (e) and RUAA § 15(c) authorize an arbitrator to postpone or ad-
journ the proceeding, and to hear evidence and decide the controversy. Section 1282.2(d) and
RUAA § 15(d) authorize the parties to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.
144. California is among the few states that has legislation explicitly governing the conduct of
an arbitration hearing. The majority of states, including Florida, Massachusetts, New York, Texas
and Virginia, give great latitude to arbitrators. The only limits generally required in those states
regard proper notice, adjournment of the hearing, and the right to cross-examine.
145. See, e.g., Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1997) (arbitration
panel's refusal to continue hearing to allow witness to testify amounts to fundamental unfairness and
misconduct sufficient to vacate the award); Slaney v. The Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 244 F.3d
580, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing cases applying fundamental fairness rle).
146. Birbrower v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. Rptr.2d 304, (1998).
147. Id. at 310-12.
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ceedings. The shock effects of Birbrower were "acute and widespread."' 48 The
legislature responded to Birbrower by adopting the current 1282.4 provisions,
which adopt a pro hac vice approach for out-of state attorney arbitration coun-
sel. 49 The current version of Section 1282.4 expires on January 1, 2006, at
which time the statute provides simply that "a party to the arbitration has the
right to be represented by an attorney at any proceeding or hearing in arbitration
under this title." Presumably after this date, the Birbrower rule will be in ef-
fect. 50
While the current 1282.4 provides temporary relief to the problems raised
by Birbrower, it also will have a chilling effect on parties considering California
as the situs for arbitration. The sunset clause in 1282.4 will restrict their choice
of counsel in any dispute arising from the contract after January 1, 2006. Rather
than continue renewing a sunset provision, it is recommended that the current
version of 1282.4 should be retained indefinitely. Maintaining the current rule
of 1282.4 would be among the most significant steps the legislature could take
to foster the perception that California is a friendly forum for arbitration. At a
minimum, California law regarding international arbitration should be liberal-
ized to permit lawyers not licensed in California to represent parties in arbitra-
tions in California.' 5'
The RUAA does not address of out-of-state representation. Nor does Sec-
tion 16 of the RUAA directly address Birbrower.'52 The comments to Section
16 confirm that the RUAA was drafted without reference to this issue, stating
that "[t]his section is not intended to preclude, where authorized by law, repre-
sentation in an arbitration proceeding by individuals who are not licensed to
practice either generally or in the jurisdiction in which the arbitration is held."'' 53
Because the RUAA does not address the fundamental problem posed by Bir-
brower, it is not recommended that Section 16 be followed. It is recommended
148. Quintin Johnstone, Unauthorized Practice of Law and the Power of State Courts: Diffi-
cult Problems and Their Resolution, 39 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 795, 819 (2003).
149. CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 1282.4(b) ("an attorney admitted to the bar of any other state
may represent parties in the course of... an arbitration proceeding in this state, provided that the
attorney... timely files the [required] certificate..."). This provision is effective through December
31,2005.
150. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.4(a). This provision is effective January 1,2006.
151. Compare Section 1297.351 providing with respect to conciliation that "a person assisting
or representing a party need not be a member of the legal profession or licensed to practice law in
California."
152. RUAA § 16 simply states that "[a] party to an arbitration proceeding may be represented
by a lawyer."
153. RUAA, § 16, cmt. 2.
that the current version of Section 1282.4 should be retained, with the sunset
provision in Section 1282.4 0 ) repealed.
California has special provisions for discovery in arbitrations involving per-
sonal injury and death claims due to negligence or wrongful acts. Under Section
1283.05 and Section 1283.1, mandatory rules guarantee parties the right to take
depositions and obtain discovery in the same manner as litigation in California
courts.'54 These provisions, while imposing a mandatory rule of discovery,
evince clear legislative intent to secure discovery rights for parties in personal
injury tort claims. It is not, however, without problems. First, California courts
have limited the impact of these provisions, finding that they grant arbitrators
the authority to order certain types of discovery, but are not explicitly and un-
ambiguously binding on arbitrators. 155 In addition, what constitutes an "injury"
is unclear; 156 a qualifier such as "personal injury" or "bodily injury" would assist
in clarifying the legislative intent. If the term "injury" were broadly construed
to include business torts, such as fraud claims, this provision could dramatically
impact commercial arbitration. Failure to clarify the matter could result in a
mandatory rule that inadvertently undermines party autonomy in commercial
arbitration. Presumably these provisions were included to address negligent and
intentional torts. If so, it should be so limited. Section 1283.05 and 1283.1
should be retained with the clarification of what constitutes an "injury" within
the meaning of Section 1283.1.
The most important substantive issue pertaining to discovery concerns re-
quests for documents and depositions. Section 1282.6 authorizes arbitrators to
issue subpoenas requiring attendance of witnesses and subpoenas duces tecum
for the production of documents.'57 Section 1282.8 likewise authorizes an arbi-
trator to administer oaths,158 and Section 1283 addresses the authority of arbitra-
tors to take depositions. 15  These provisions are modeled on Section 7 of the
UAA. 16 Under Section 1282.6, third parties may be issued subpoenas, but, with
the exception of Section 1283.05 discussed above, arbitrators do not have the
power to enforce subpoenas for discovery purposes in the same manner as a
judge does in a civil proceeding.'16 Under Section 1282.6(c), subpoenas shall be
154. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1283.05 (After the appointment of the arbitrator.. the parties to
the arbitration shall have.. all of the same rights, remedies, and procedures.. .as if the subject matter
of the arbitration were pending before a superior court of this state...).
155. Alexander v. Blue Cross of Cal., 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 436, 437, n.4 (Cal. App. Ct. I
Dist. 2001).
156. Armandariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs, Inc., 99 Cal. 2d 745, 761 (2000).
157. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.6 (2003).
158. Id. at § 1282.8.
159. Id. at § 1283.
160. UAA § 7 (1956).
161. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.6(a) ("A subpoena.. at an arbitration proceeding or a
deposition under Section 1283, and if Section 1283.05 is applicable.. .shall be issued as provided in
this section.").
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served and enforced utilizing the procedures set forth in Section 1985 et seq.16 2
Consequently, any such subpoena must be enforced by a court.
California is not alone in its procedures for administering subpoenas and
oaths. Almost every state allows arbitrators to issue subpoenas, including Flor-
ida, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
Texas and Virginia.'63 These same states generally allow arbitrators to adminis-
ter oaths as well. There is, however, a difference in how the states enforce sub-
poenas issued in arbitration. Mississippi is the only state that requires subpoe-
nas to be issued, and therefore enforced, by the court. A handful of states, in-
cluding New Jersey, North Carolina and Pennsylvania, allow for arbitrators to
enforce subpoenas as if they were ordered by a court. A larger minority of
states, however, requires that subpoenas be enforced in the same manner as sub-
poenas issued in civil actions - much like the current California rule. These
states include Minnesota, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia and the District of
Columbia.
Section 17 of the RUAA does not depart in significant ways from Section 7
of the UAA. Sections 17(a) and (b) grant the arbitrator the inherent power to
provide a fair hearing, and these provisions are not waivable. 164 Sections 17(c)
and (d) likewise grants the arbitrator power to permit discovery as the arbitrator
deems appropriate, although these provisions may be waived, permitting the
precise contours of discovery to be stipulated by contract.' 65 Section 17(c) fur-
ther makes clear that discovery of third parties is permitted.166 Among the ad-
vancements reflected in Section 17, is the authority to issue protective orders
under Section 17(d) 67 and enhanced authority to enforce out-of-state subpoenas
and orders under Section 17(g). "6
Regarding arbitrator and administrative fees, Section 1284.2 provides that
parties shall share fees and expenses of the arbitration, unless the parties other-
162. Id. at § 1282.6(c) ("Subpoenas shall be served and enforced in accordance with [Section
1985] of this code.").
163. See, e.g., 34 FLA. COMM. REL. § 682.08; GA CODE § 9-9-9; MD. CODE § 3-217; MASS.
GEN. LAWS 251 § 7; NEW JERSEY S.A. 2A:23A-24; N.Y. MCKINNEY'S CPLR § 7505; 42 PA.
C.S.A.§ 7309; VERNON'S CIVIL PRACTICE & REM. CODE § 171.051; VA CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.05.
164. RUAA § 17, cmt. 2 ("Section 17(a) and (b) are not waivable under Section 4(b) because
they go to the inherent power of an arbitrator to provide a fair hearing...").
165. Id. at cmt. 3 ("Because Section 17(c) is waivable under Section 4(a), the provision is
intended to encourage parties to negotiate their own discovery procedures.").
166. RUAA § 17(c) ("An arbitrator may permit such discovery as the arbitrator decides is
appropriate in the circumstances...").
167. Id. at § 17(d).
168. Id. at § 17(g).
wise agree. 69 The majority of states, including Florida, Massachusetts, New
York, Pennsylvania, Texas and Virginia, require that administrative fees are
issued as part of the final award. 7 ° Although these states do not have provisions
for reimbursement of attorney's fees, the arbitrator may compel the losing party
to pay administrative costs as part of the award. 7' The approach of these states
is more consistent with Section 21(d) of the RUAA and Section 10 of the
UAA. 1
72
Section 21(d) of the RUAA departs from the California standard, leaving to
the arbitrator the discretion to determine who should pay arbitrator and adminis-
trative fees and expenses. 73 Regarding attorney fees and expenses, Section
1284.2 is consistent with Section 10 of UAA in prohibiting the arbitrator from
awarding attorney's fees, unless the agreement otherwise provides. 7 4 Section
21(b) departs from Section 1284.2 and authorizes the arbitrator to award reason-
able attorneys' fees and other reasonable expenses.'75
Section 21 also clarifies that the arbitrator may award punitive damages, but
that any such award must specify the legal and factual basis for the award.
176
California courts have confirmed the authority of arbitrators to award punitive
damages,'77 despite no clear statutory authorization for such damages. Section
21(a) and (e) provide a useful statutory limitation on this authority, opening
awards to challenge if punitive damages are assessed without an articulated legal
or factual basis. 7 8 Nonetheless, the codification of the arbitrator's authority to
award punitive damages has led to strong objections by the defense bar in other
states, with the result that this provision is among the more controversial in the
RUAA. These objections are unfounded given that Section 21 actually curtails
the arbitrator's existing authority to issue punitive damages. Accordingly, Sec-
tion 1284.2 should be repealed and replaced with Section 21 of the RUAA.
169. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.2.
170. 34 FLA. COMM. REL § 682.11; MASS. GEN. LAWS 251 § 10; N.Y. MCKINNEY'S CPLR §
7513.42 PA. C.S.A.§ 7309; VERNON'S CIVIL PRACTICE & REM. CODE § 171.055; VA CODE ANN. §
8.01-581.07.
171. Id.
172. RUAA § 21(d);UAA § 10.
173. RUAA § 21(d) ("An arbitrator's expenses and fees, together with other expenses, must be
paid as provided in the award."). See UAA supra note 2, § 10, which requires that "Unless otherwise
provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrators' expenses and fees.. .shall be paid as provided
in the award."
174. Villinger/Nicholls Dev. Co. v. Meleyco, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 36, 40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995);
Austin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 56, 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
175. RUAA § 21(b).
176. Id. at § 21(a) ("An arbitrator may award punitive damages or other exemplary relief if
such an award is authorized by law in a civil action involving the same claim...").
177. See, e.g.,Baker v. Sadick, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 681-82 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th1984).
178. RUAA § 2 1(e) ("If an arbitrator awards punitive damages or other exemplary relief ... the
arbitrator shall specify in the award the basis in fact justifying and the basis in law authorizing the
award...").
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In 2002, California adopted a new provision on fees in consumer arbitra-
tions.' The import of Section 1284.3 is to set parameters for the payment of
fees and expenses by consumers, including (1) the right of indigent consumers
not to pay for the costs of arbitration, (2) limitations on the payment of fees and
expenses if the consumer is the non-prevailing party, and (3) petitions for the
waiver of fees by a consumer.80 These modifications reflect an enlightened
development to curb some of the abuses associated with consumer arbitration.
Two issues relating to 1284.3 are of particular concern. First, Section
1284.3 does not define what constitutes a "consumer," thus leaving to the courts
this difficult interpretative issue.' 8' Section 1284.3(c) also stipulates that the
provisions apply to "all consumer arbitration agreements subject to this article
and to all consumer arbitration proceedings conducted in California."'' 82 This
gives rise to preemption concerns, to the extent that California is imposing an
obligation that is inconsistent with federal law, imposing special burdens on
consumer arbitration that are not imposed at the federal level. However, such
preemption is far from obvious. Given the understandable concerns of the legis-
lature to protect consumers involved in arbitration, Section 1284.3 should be
retained without modification.'83
Section 18 of the RUAA includes an important new provision relating to
judicial enforcement of pre-award rulings by the arbitrator. 84 There is no com-
parable provision in California law or most other state laws.'85 Section 18 con-
verts such an order into an award at the request of a party, and authorizes judi-
cial enforcement of that award in the same manner as any other award. 186 The
objectives of Section 18 are to provide a statutory basis for enforcement of such
orders and limit the grounds for challenge to such enforcement to those estab-
179. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.3.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at § 1284.3(c) (emphasis added).
183. Other states have been slow to develop procedures for consumer arbitrations. Thus far,
only New Mexico has adopted separate consumer arbitration guidelines in the form of a Fair Bar-
gaining Act.
184. RUAA § 18 ("If an arbitrator makes a pre-award ruling in favor of a party.. .the party may
request the arbitrator to incorporate the ruling into an award...").
185. At least 40 states do not have such a pre-award provision, including Florida, Georgia,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas and Virginia. However,
most jurisdictions interpret the FAA provisions on interim measures much in the same way as Sec-
tion 18 was intended. See, e.g., Southern Seas Navigation, Ltd. of Monrovia v.Petroleos Mexicanos
of Mexico City, 606 F. Supp. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Island Creek Coal Sales Co. v. City of Gaines-
ville, 729 F.2d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1984).
186. RUAA § 18.
lished for vacation, modification, or correction.' 87 Section 18 of the RUAA
should be adopted without modification.
Section 1283.4 addresses the form and content of awards.'88 It is unremark-
able and, with one significant exception, follows the UAA. 189 The RUAA is a
modest improvement, requiring the arbitrator to make a signed or authenticated
"record" of an award.'9g This is intended to permit electronic signatures and
awards. Sections 1283.6 and 1283.8 are consistent with Section 19 of the
RUAA.' 9' Because Section 19 offers a modest improvement over Sections
1283.4 through 1283.8, those provisions should be repealed and Section 19
adopted.
As to correction of awards, Section 20 of the RUAA marks a significant
improvement over Section 1284. It provides the grounds for seeking correction
of an award.192 Sections 20(a) & (d) include additional grounds for correcting an
award: to request that the arbitrator to clarify the award and make a final and
definite award upon a claim. 9 3 Any correction may be made directly by the
arbitrator immediately following an award, or upon submission by the court to
the arbitrator pursuant to Section 20(d). 94 In so providing, the RUAA has modi-
fied the traditional doctrine of functus officio that prevents an arbitrator after
issuing an award from acting further.'95 By allowing an arbitrator to correct or
clarify an award, this provision enhances the authority of arbitrators to fulfill
their mandate, rendering the arbitral process more efficient.'96 Section 1284
should be repealed and Section 20 adopted without modification.
Recommendation: On the conduct of the arbitration hearing, Section
1282.2 should be repealed and replaced with Section 15 of the RUAA. The
California provision expresses a fundamental reluctance to grant the arbitrators
leeway in how an arbitration proceeding is conducted. This approach is anti-
thetical to the basic pro-arbitration policies that otherwise adumbrates arbitration
law in California. Regarding the unauthorized practice of law, the current ver-
187. RUAA § 18, cmt. 1.
188. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1283.4.
189. Compare Section 1283.4 (adding a provision stipulating that there must be a "determina-
tion of all the questions submitted to the arbitrators..."), with UAA, supra note 2, § 8.
190. RUAA § 19(a).
191. Section 1283.6 deals with the service of an award, and Section 1283.8 deals with the time
for making an award. These provisions correspond with RUAA § 19(a), (b). In general, the law of
California, and the laws of the several states are consistent with the RUAA.
192. Under this section, an arbitrator may correct an award for four reasons: (1) to fix miscal-
culations or an evident mistake; (2) the award is imperfect in a matter of form; (3) because the arbi-
trator has not made a final and definite award upon each claim; or (4) to clarify the award. Section
1284 allows an arbitrator to correct an award for only two of these four reasons: (1) to fix miscalcu-
lations or an evident mistake or (2) the award is imperfect in a matter of form.
193. RUAA §§ 20(a) & (d).
194. RUAA § 20(d).
195. RUAA § 20, cmt. 2.
196. RUAA § 20, cmt. 4.
[Vol. 4:1, 2003]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
sion of Section 1282.4 should be retained and the sunset provision in Section
1282.4(j) should be repealed. Section 1282.4 through 1283 should be repealed
and Section 17 should be adopted. Section 1283.05 and 1283.1 should be re-
tained with the clarification of what constitutes an "injury" within the meaning
of Section 1283.1. Section 1284.2 should be repealed and replaced with Section
21. Section 1284.3 should be retained without modification. Section 18 of the
RUAA should be adopted regarding judicial enforcement of pre-award rulings
of an arbitrator. Section 1283.4 through 1283.8 should be repealed and Section
19 should be adopted. Section 1284 should be repealed and Section 20 should
be adopted without modification.
V. CHAPTER 4 - ENFORCEMENT OF THE AWARD
A. Confirmation, Correction or Vacation of the Award
Sections 1285 through 1287.6 provide for detailed requirements relating to
the confirmation, correction, or vacation of an award.'97 The essence of these
provisions is that any award shall be confirmed unless there are grounds to va-
cate or correct the award.' 98 Consequently, the core provisions are the enumer-
ated grounds for vacation or correction of an award."9 A judgment confirming
an award has the same force and effect as any judgment in a civil action, while
an unconfirmed award generally has the same status as a contract, 200 although an
arbitral award may have res judicata effect depending on whether or not it is
confirmed.2 °"
Section 1285 provides that "[a]ny party to an arbitration in which an award
has been made may petition the court to confirm, correct, or vacate the
award. ' '20 2 Section 1286 then provides that "the court shall confirm the award as
made, whether rendered in this state or another state, unless ... it corrects the
197. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1285-1287.6.
198. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1286 ("[T]he court shall confirm the award.. unless in accor-
dance with this chapter it corrects the award and confirms it as corrected, vacates the award or dis-
misses the proceeding.")
199. An award shall be vacated for the grounds listed in CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2. The
court may correct an award under section 1286.8.
200. Ikerd v. Warren T. Merrill & Sons, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 398, 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) ("As an
arbitration award, once confirmed, leads to a judgment which has the same force and effect as a
judgment in a civil action...").
201. In re Ter Bush, 273 B.R. 625, 628 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2002); Brinton v. Bankers Pension
Servs., Inc., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 469, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
202. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1285 (West 2003).
award and confirms it as corrected, vacates the award or dismisses the proceed-
ing."2 3 Courts have interpreted Section 1286 to impose a mandatory obligation
on courts, once a petition has been filed, to confirm, correct or vacate a final and
binding award.2°4
Sections 1285 and 1286 depart slightly from Section 11 of the UAA, fol-
lowed by the majority of states. Section 11 provides that "[ulpon application of
a party, the Court shall confirm an award, unless within the time limits hereinaf-
ter imposed grounds are urged for vacating or modifying or correcting the
award ... "205
Section 22 of the RUAA is similar to the UAA, providing that "[a]fter a
party to an arbitration receives notice of an award, the party may make a motion
to the court for an order confirming the award at which time the court shall issue
a confirming order unless the award is modified or corrected.., or is vacated ......
Section 25(a) provides that [u]pon granting an order confirming, vacating ....
modifying, or correcting an award, the court shall enter a judgment in confor-
mity therewith."
Sections 1285.2 through 1285.8 appear to be unique to California, stipulat-
ing the contents that must be included in any petition or response to confirm,
correct, or vacate an award. Failure to respond to a petition may also deprive a
party to the arbitration of "litigant status" in the confirmation proceeding,
thereby preventing their participation in subsequent stages of the judicial pro-
ceeding.20 6 Parties must substantially comply with these procedures and provide
the court with access to the agreement, the names of the arbitrators, and the
award.2"7 It appears that the provisions in these sections are unnecessary and
find no parallel in other state statutes. It is not recommended that these provi-
sions be retained.
203. Id. at § 1286.
204. Encino Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 378, 385 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2000). ("Upon a petition seeking any of those results, the court must confirm the award,
unless it either vacates or corrects it."). But see Heenan v. Sobati, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532, 538-39.
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (no obligation of court to "confirm" decision if it is not an arbitration award).
205. The states that follow the example of UAA § I I include Delaware, Florida, Massachu-
setts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia and the District of
Columbia.
206. Reisman v. Shahverdian, 201 Cal.Rptr. 194, 202 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1984) ("[D]efendants
failed to file a response to the petition, as permitted by Code of Civil Procedure, section 1285.2;
more importantly, they failed to appear at ... hearing on this motion, despite receiving adequate
notice of this hearing. Party litigant status can be lost by a party who fails to appear at trial despite
receipt of proper notice.").
207. Puccinelli v. Nestor, 301 P.2d 921 (Cal. App. 1956); Horn v. Gurewitz, 67 Cal. Rptr. 791,
794 (Cal. App. 1968) (requirements of section 1285 met with oral agreement to arbitrate when
substance of agreement was set forth was filed in pleadings). But see Nohre v. W.J. Gallagher &
Co., 2002 WL 31424914 (2002) (unpublished decision) (a court refused to review an award where
the petitioner failed to provide a copy of the arbitration agreement).
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The most important provision in this chapter relates to vacation of arbitral
awards in section 1286.2. Consistent with other states, judicial review of arbi-
tral awards is limited to major procedural irregularities. 28 This enhances the
finality of arbitral awards and the success of arbitration as an efficient process.
The bases set forth for vacatur are virtually identical to the UAA and the
RUAA. These include vacating awards if (1) the award was procured by corrup-
tion, fraud or undue means; (2) there was evident partiality of the neutral arbitra-
tor; (3) corruption of any arbitrator; (4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers;
and (5) substantial prejudice resulting from failure to postpone hearing, hear
evidence or by other conduct. 2°9
However, there are a few key differences between the 1286.2 and the
RUAA. First, like the UAA, Section 23(a)(5) of the RUAA allows for the vaca-
tion of an award based on a party's assertion that there is no valid arbitration
agreement. 21 ° Second, Section 23(a)(6) of the RUAA authorizes the court to
vacate an arbitral award if one of the parties did not receive proper notice of the
arbitration proceeding. 1 Finally, section 1286.2(6) of the California code in-
cludes a separate enumeration for vacation of awards based on improper arbitra-
tor disclosures.212
To the extent the California grounds for vacatur depart from federal law,
there is a significant potential that litigation will ensue over whether an award
involves interstate commerce and if so, whether such ground for vacation are
pre-empted by federal law. In a recent case, the North District of California held
that "[a]pplication of the California standards would impose inconsistent and
conflicting procedural rules upon those specifically agreed upon by the parties.
208. Harris v. Sandro, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 910, 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) ("Judicial review is
severely limited because that result 'vindicates the intentions of the parties that the award be final,
and because an arbitrator is not ordinarily constrained to decide according to the rule of law..."')
(citing Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 900 (Cal. 1992)). Most states authorize vacation
of awards if there is evidence of (1) corruption (2) partiality (3) an arbitrator exceeding his powers
(4) a refusal to hear evidence or postpone a hearing or (5) no valid arbitration agreement existed.
209. Compare RUAA § 23 ("Vacating Award"), with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2
("Grounds for vacation of award").
210. RUAA § 23(a)(5) ("[T]he court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding
if.. .there was no agreement to arbitrate...").
211. RUAA § 23(a)(6) ("[T]he court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding
if...the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an arbitration...").
212. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2(a)(6) ("[T]he court shall vacate an award made in the
arbitration proceeding if.. An arbitrator making the award.. .failed to disclose.. .a ground for dis-
qualification..."). This Section also has a significant and recent exclusion for arbitration agree-
ments conducted under a collective bargaining agreement. See id. ("However, this subdivision does
not apply to arbitration proceedings conducted under a collective bargaining agreement...").
Because such a result is impermissible under § 2 of the FAA, the California
standards.. .conflict with the FAA and the federal policy embedded therein. 21 3
In particular, Section 1286.2(6) provisions for vacatur for improper disclosure
raise the specter of federal preemption.' 4 This provision is unique to California,
with almost all other states identifying such conduct as falling under provisions
for arbitrator bias or misconduct. Indeed, California courts have interpreted
failure to disclose as arbitrator misconduct under Section 1286.2(a)(3). 215 Given
that failure to disclose has been interpreted as falling under other provisions of
Section 1286, Section 1286.2(6) is in many respects superfluous. 16
In addition, there are a number of word variations that are significant. Sec-
tion 23(a)(4) of the RUAA on exceeding powers has no provision for correcting
the award in lieu of vacatur.217 Sections 23(a)(2)(A) and (C) provide for vacatur
if there was "evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral '2 ,8 or
"misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party" 219 while Section
1286.2 provides for vacation if "[t]he rights of the party were substantially
prejudiced by misconduct of a neutral arbitrator. '220  Both of these variations
reflect greater concern for procedural irregularities and will result in more
awards vacated under the RUAA.
There are two well-known non-statutory common law bases for vacation of
arbitration awards that are not included in the RUAA. The first concerns mani-
fest disregard of the law and the second concerns awards that violate public
policy. According to extensive commentary in the RUAA, 221 neither of these
213. Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
214. Section 1286.2 has been subject to preemption analysis by the courts. See, e.g., Muao v.
Grosvenor Props., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 131 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that the FAA did not preempt
section 1286.2's procedures for reviewing arbitral awards); Siegel v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 79
Cal. Rptr. 2d 726 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that the FAA does not preempt section 1286.2 even
though the FAA and 1286.2 differ on the judicial review process for claims of manifest disregard).
215. Section 1286.2 (a)(3) states that an award shall be vacated if the "rights of the party were
substantially prejudiced by the misconduct of a neutral arbitrator." In using Section 1286.2 to vacate
awards, the courts have often blurred the lines between the subsections of the statute. See Ceriale v.
AMCO Ins. Co., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 685, 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (vacating an award based on com-
mon law standard of arbitrator bias); Michael v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 240
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that the vacation of an award for "corruption, fraud and undue means"
can include an arbitrator's failure to make disclosures as required by statute).
216. See, e.g., Michael v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 240, 248 (Cal. App. 2d
2001) ("where an ... arbitrator fails to disclose matters required to be disclosed by section 1281.9
and a party later discovers disclosure should have been made, that failure to disclose constitutes one
form of "corruption" for purposes of section 1286.2, subdivision (b) and thus provides a ground for
vacating an award.).
217. RUAA § 23(a)(4) ("[T]he court shall vacate an award.. if.. .the arbitrator exceeded the
arbitrator's powers...").
218. RUAA § 23(a)(2)(A).
219. RUAA § 23(a)(2)(C).
220. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (2003).
221. See RUAA § 23, cmt. C.
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common law grounds for vacation are codified in the FAA or any state law,
222
and the RUAA does not endorse such codification.223 The RUAA drafters re-
fused to do so because of uncertainty surrounding these doctrines and because
attempts at codification likely would be preempted.224
California state courts have been reluctant to adopt the doctrine of manifest
disregard of the law as part of California arbitration law. In Siegel v. Prudential
Insurance Co., the court rejected a claim that the federal common law doctrine
of manifest disregard of the law should apply to a petition to vacate an arbitra-
tion award under section 1286.2, holding that that federal common law doctrine
does not preempt state law and has no application to judicial review of arbitra-
tion awards in state courts. 225 Numerous cases confirm that California courts
will not vacate an award on the basis of errors of fact or law, unless such mis-
take falls within one of the grounds set forth in 1286.2.226
California courts also have been reluctant to vacate arbitration awards based
on the doctrine of violations of public policy. "Courts will vacate or correct an
award at the behest of a party who demonstrates it is invalid insofar as it orders
an illegal act.... This stems from the general principle that the judiciary will not
enforce a contract so as to compel the performance of an illegal act. ' 227 But
courts will treat such a violation as grounds for vacation because an arbitrator
"exceeded their powers" within the meaning of Section 1286.2(4).22s
One final ground for vacatur, that is not included in the RUAA, is worth
mentioning. In the public construction context, Section 1296 provides that the
parties may expressly agree in writing that the arbitrator's award shall be sup-
ported by law and substantial evidence.229 It then provides for vacatur of the
award if "after review of the award it determines either that the award is not
222. Id. at cmt. C(l). ("The Drafting Committee also considered the advisability of adding two
new subsections to Section 23(a) sanctioning vacatur of awards that result from a 'manifest disregard
of the law' or for an award that violates 'public policy.' Neither of these two standards is presently
codified in the FAA or in any of the state arbitration acts.").
223. Id. at cmt. C(5).
224. Id.
225. Siegel v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726, 740 & n.7 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998) (citing Lesser Towers, Inc. v. Roscoe-Ajax Constr. Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1969)).
226. See, e.g., Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183, 203 (1992); Roitz v. Cold-
well Banker Resid.Brok. Co., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85, 88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Schlessinger v.
Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
227. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sup. Ct., 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 318-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd
on other grounds, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 581, 590 (1994).
228. Id.
229. CAL. CIv. PROc. CODE § 1296 (2003).
supported by substantial evidence or that it is based on an error of law."23 The
drafters of the RUAA debated at length a proposal to add a provision permitting
heightened judicial scrutiny as a basis for vacating an award under section 23 of
the RUAA. In the end, the drafters determined that the law was in a state of flux
and decided not to include a statutory sanction of expanded judicial review,
leaving the parties "free to agree to contractual provisions for judicial review of
challenged awards . . . until the courts finally determine the propriety of such
clauses. 23 ' The inclusion of expanded judicial review in the context of public
construction arbitration has led one court to conclude that such expanded review
is excluded in all other contexts.232 It is unclear why the California legislature
would grant the right to expanded judicial review in one context but not others.
On the issue of rehearing, Section 1287 permits a rehearing if the award is
vacated and such rehearing may be before the same arbitrators if it is vacated on
the grounds set forth in Section 1286.2(d) or (e).233 The approach taken by Sec-
tion 23(c) of the RUAA is virtually identical. A rehearing is permitted in almost
all cases in which there is vacation, 234 but a court may refer the matter back to
the same arbitrator or a new arbitrator, depending on the ground for vacation. 35
Furthermore, the majority of states include provisions on rehearing. Like Cali-
fornia, those states generally allow a rehearing before the same arbitrator unless
the award was vacated for bias or corruption.
On the subject of correcting awards, the provisions of Section 1286.6 and
Section 24 of the RUAA are almost identical. The only significant difference is
Section 24(a)(2), which permits corrections if "the arbitrator has madean award
on a claim not submitted to the arbitrator" while Section 1286.6 uses the phrase
"the arbitrators exceeded their powers." The California provision permits cor-
rection of an award if the arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award may
be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision. If an arbitrator's ex-
cess of power affects the merits, the award may not be corrected, but may be
vacated under Section 1286.2.
Recommendations: Perhaps the California's legislature's most important
decision regarding revisions to the California arbitration statute concern this
section of the statute. It goes to the heart of judicial supervision of arbitration
awards. Based on the foregoing discussion, it is recommended that the Califor-
230. Id.
231. RUAA § 23, cmt. B.
232. Crowell v. Downey Cmty. Hosp. Found., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 815-17 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
233. Section 1287 failed to reflect the statutory renumeration of Section 1286.2 following
recent amendments. Presumably, Section 1287 should read "If the award is vacated on the grounds
set forth in subdivision a(4) or a(5)..."
234. Except the absence of an agreement to arbitrate under Section 23(a)(5).
235. RUAA § 23(a)(5).
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nia statute be revised to establish greater consistency and uniformity with other
states and the RUAA. Specifically, it is recommended that Sections 1285
through 1286 be repealed and replaced with Section 22 of the RUAA. It is fur-
ther recommended that the provisions on vacation, correction, and rehearing in
Sections 1286.2 through Section 1287 be repealed and replaced with Section 23
and 24. If the provisions of 1286.2 are retained, Section 23(a)(5) and Section
23(a)(6) should be added to the grounds for vacation. The provisions for con-
tractually requested expanded review and vacation under Section 1296 should be
incorporated in Section 23 and expanded beyond public construction contracts.
B. Limitations of Time
Sections 1288 through 1288.8 provides the time for service and filing of pe-
titions and responses. The most important provision is Section 1288 which re-
lates to the deadline for confirming the award, stipulating that it is "not later
than four years after the date of service of a signed copy of the award. 236 In
addition, a party seeking to vacate an award must do so within 100 days after
receiving service of the award.237
The FAA includes a one-year provision for confirming an award 38 and a
90-day deadline for motions to vacate. 239 The RUAA considered but rejected a
specific statute of limitation for confirmations, opting instead for "the general
statute of limitations in a State for the filing and execution on a judgment should
apply. '240 Like the FAA, the RUAA includes a 90-day provision for motions to
vacate under Section 23(b).24
Section 1288.6 precludes a party from filing a petition to confirm, modify
or correct an award if an application has been made to the arbitrators to correct
the award.242 Section 20(d) of the RUAA takes a different and more efficient
approach, permitting such a filing but authorizing a court to submit the claim to
the arbitrators.243
Recommendation: The four-year confirmation deadline in Section 1288
should be retained and included as a modified Section 22 of the RUAA. Section
236. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1288.
237. Id.
238. FAA § 9, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2003).
239. FAA § 12,9 U.S.C. § 12 (2003).
240. RUAA, § 2, cmt. 2.
241. RUAA § 23(b).
242. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1288.6.
243. RUAA § 20(d).
22 should be revised with the introductory clause reading, "[wlithin four years
after a party to an arbitration proceeding receives notice of an award . The
100-day provision of Section 1288 should be repealed in light of the previous
recommendation to adopt Section 23, which incorporates a 90-day deadline.
Section 1288.6 and Section 1288.8 should be repealed in light of the recommen-
dation to adopt Section 20, which anticipates court referral to arbitrators of
claims for modification or correction. The remaining provisions, Section 1288.2
and Section 1288.4 are unique to California and serve little purpose. If they are
retained, they should be incorporated into Sections 22 through 24.
VI. CHAPTER 5 - GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Petitions and Responses
Sections 1290 through 1291.2 were originally based on Section 16 of the
UAA and provide that legal actions to a court involving arbitration will be re-
solved by motion and not by trial.21 It incorporates detailed provisions on
commencement, summary hearing, service and notice, timing and manner of
serving response, statement of decision and setting for hearing; hearing; and
preference.
Most states have adopted provisions that are based upon Section 16 of the
UAA.245 States generally recognize that legal actions involving an arbitration
matter are to be resolved by motion, not by trial, and that the motions will be
filed in the same manner as in a civil action.246 This is consistent with the gen-
eral view that such actions are fundamentally similar to motions for specific
performance of a contract, which, at common law, were resolved by courts of
equity without a jury trial.
Section 5(a) and 5(b) of the RUAA are comparable to Section 1290.2 and
1290.4, respectively.247 However, the RUAA is far more skeletal than the Cali-
fornia provisions and creates significantly greater ambiguities as a result.
It is noteworthy that the California Supreme Court has upheld the constitu-
tionality of Section 1290, holding that summary procedure for decision as to
244. In addition, sections 5(a) and 5(b) of the RUAA were based on section 16 of the UAA.
RUAA § 5, cmt. 1.
245. States that have adopted Section 16 include Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
246. Under UAA § 16, "an application to the court under this act shall be by motion and shall
be heard in the manner and upon the notice provided by law or rule of court for the making and
hearing of motions."
247. Both Section 1290.2 and Section 5(a) of the RUAA mirror Section 16 of the UAA by
stating that arbitrations should be conducted via motion and not by trials. Section 1290.4 and RUAA
§ 5(b) both pertain to the requirement of proper notice.
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whether a valid arbitration agreement exists does not violate state constitutional
rights to due process and jury trial.248
Recommendations: Section 5 of the RUAA should not be adopted and the
language in Sections 1290 through 1291.2 should be retained without modifica-
tion. The provisions of 1290 through 1291.2 should be included as a modified
Section 5 of the RUAA. Section 4(b)(1), which references Section 5(a), should
be modified accordingly.
B. Venue, Jurisdiction, and Costs
Sections 1292 through 1293.2 have detailed provisions as to venue, jurisdic-
tion, and costs. The essential import of the provisions is to establish criteria for
jurisdiction and venue based on the contractual agreement. Under Section 1292,
prior to commencement of the arbitration, venue is proper in the county where
the agreement was made or is to be performed.249 The statute also incorporates
venue rules in the absence of such a stipulation. Under Section 1292.2, follow-
ing commencement of the arbitration proceeding, venue is proper where the
arbitration is being or has been held".
Most states follow the UAA Sections 17 and 18 and provide that jurisdic-
tion and venue is proper in the county "in which the agreement provides the
arbitration hearing shall be held or, if the hearing has been held, in the county in
which it was held".25' Section 27 of the RUAA is similar, providing for venue
where the agreement to arbitrate "specifies the arbitration hearing is to be held
or, if the hearing has been held, in the court of the [county] in which it was
held. 25 2
248. Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Sec. Corp., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 885-86 (1996) (A
petition to compel arbitration is in essence a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a
contract. Because actions for specific performance were not recognized at common law, the Califor-
nia Constitution does not guarantee the parties to such a proceeding a jury trial. Moreover, the fact
that in an action for specific performance of an agreement the court must determine the existence of
the agreement does not itself transform the action into one at law. Under these principles, plaintiffs
are not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial on whether the arbitration agreements should be spe-
cifically enforced, including the question whether they are void for fraud.)
249. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1292 (2003).
250. Id. at § 1292.2.
251. UAA §§ 17-18 (1956). States that have adopted language similar to the UAA include
Delaware, Florida, New York, Pennsylvania and Texas. Several states, including Massachusetts and
the District of Columbia, do not address venue in their arbitration provisions.
252. RUAA § 27.
It appears that the California provisions on venue depart from the RUAA in
at least one important respect.253 Section 1292 permits venue in a forum other
than where the arbitration is to be held, by stipulating that an action may be
commenced in "[t]he county where the agreement is to be performed or was
made. '254 This invites forum shopping in confirmation proceedings in either the
place of performance or the place where the contract was made. Moreover, by
using the phrase "to be performed" it creates an ambiguity as to whether the
statute is identifying the county where the arbitration is to be held, or where the
underlying substantive performance of the contract is to be undertaken. Assum-
ing "to be performed" refers to the latter, there is a potential inconsistency if the
contract is performed in a venue other than where the arbitration hearing is to be
held. The RUAA was drafted with this concern, and recognizes that forum-
selection clauses can raise issues of forum-shopping and unconscionability. 255
Specifically, the RUAA includes a provision in Section 26 that expressly
grants exclusive jurisdiction in the state, if the agreement to arbitrate provides
for arbitration in the state.25 6 This provision prevents forum-shopping in confir-
mation proceedings 257 and promotes "party autonomy in the choice of the loca-
tion of the arbitration. 258  This provision is substantially similar to Section
1293, which confers jurisdiction on California courts if the parties agree to arbi-
trate in California.259 Unlike Section 26, however, Section 1293 does not con-
tain exclusivity language.
Section 26 is less complete than section 1293 in one important respect.
While Section 26(b) provides that an agreement to arbitrate in the State "confers
exclusive jurisdiction on the court to enter judgment on an award",2 ° Section
26(a) does not clearly provide that such an agreement also constitutes consent to
enforce an arbitration agreement. 261 The comments suggest that this change was
made to afford consumers the right to challenge an arbitration agreement in any
state that has personal and subject matter jurisdiction over a corporation. But it
253. In addition, there are a number of venue provisions in the California statute - Sections
1292.4 through 1292.8 - that have no corollary in the RUAA. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1292.4 (Order to
arbitrate), 1292.6 (Continuing Jurisdiction), 1292.8 (Motion for stay of action). These provisions,
however, do not appear inconsistent with anything contained in the RUAA.
254. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1292.
255. RUAA § 27, cmt. 2.
256. RUAA § 26.
257. Id. at § 26, cmt. 3.
258. Id.
259. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1293.
260. RUAA § 26(b) ("An agreement to arbitrate.. in this State confers exclusive jurisdiction on
the court...").
261. Id. at § 26(a) ("A court of this State having jurisdiction... may enforce an agreement to
arbitrate.").
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also has had the undesirable effect of omitting any reference to consent as a
basis for personal jurisdiction under Section 26(a).262
Section 1293.2 provides that a "court shall award costs upon any judicial
proceeding" as provided by Chapter 6 of title 14 (commencing with Section
102 1).263 Section 25(b) and (c) of the RUAA permits the award of attorney's
fees and reasonable expenses of litigation to prevailing parties in contested judi-
cial actions to confirm, vacate, modify or correct an award.26 Section 1293.2,
which incorporates Section 1021, does not clearly permit the award of attorney's
fees to prevailing parties in contested confirmation proceedings. As noted in the
comments to noted in the comments to the RUAA, granting courts the power to
award attorney's fees in appropriate circumstances promotes the finality of arbi-
tration awards and will "discourage all but the most meritorious challenges of
arbitration awards. 265
Recommendation: Section 1293.2 should be repealed and Section 25
should be adopted without modification. Section 26 of the RUAA should not be
adopted and the language of section 1293 should be retained with the inclusion
of the word "exclusive" prior to the word "jurisdiction." Section 1293 should be
included as a modified Section 26 of the RUAA. Section 4(b)(l), which refer-
ences Section 26, should not be modified. Section 27 of the RUAA should not
be adopted and the language of Sections 1292 through 1292.8 should be re-
tained, except that Section 1292 should be modified to clarify that venue prior to
commencement of a proceeding should be in the country where the agreement
stipulates the arbitration hearing is to be held.
C. Appeals
Sections 1294 through 1294.2 address appealable orders and the manner of
taking appeal. Regarding orders that may be appealed, Section 1294 addresses
only five such orders.266 Section 1294 is based on section 19 of the UAA267 and
262. Id. at § 26, cmts. 2-3. Although the comments indicate broad jurisdictional possibilities,
venue provisions in Section 27 appear to limit where a jurisdictional challenge could be made.
263. CAL. CtV. PROC. CODE § 1293.2.
264. RUAA § 25(b)-(c).
265. Id. at § 25, cmt. c.
266. Under Section 1294, a party may appeal from (1) an order dismissing or denying a petition
to compel arbitration (2) an order dismissing a petition to confirm, correct or vacate (3) an order
vacating an award unless a rehearing in arbitration is ordered (4) a judgment entered pursuant to this
title (5) a special order after final judgment. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1294.
267. Under Section 19 of the UAA, "An appeal may be taken from: (1) An order denying an
application to compel arbitration made under Section 2; (2) An order granting an application to stay
is consistent with the approach taken by many states. 268 The appealable orders
enumerated in Section 28 of the RUAA are virtually identical in nature with
Section 1294, with two exceptions:26 9 (1) the RUAA includes orders granting a
motion to stay arbitration; and (2) Section 1294 includes a "special order" after
final judgment.27
More significantly, Section 1294.2 includes detailed provisions on the scope
of review of orders that are appealed. This provision is quite unusual and is not
reflected in the UAA, the RUAA, or other states. Nor is Section 1294.2 subject
to any significant precedential authority. 27' It appears that Section 1294.2 corre-
sponds with other provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure, particu-
larly Section 906, and confirms that the scope of review of appealable orders in
arbitration are consistent with the scope of review for other appealable judg-
ments and orders under 904. 1.272
Recommendation: Section 1294 should be repealed and replaced with Sec-
tion 28(a) of the RUAA. The language and enumerated list of appealable orders
constitutes a slight improvement over the UAA, on which Section 1294 is based.
Section 1294.2 should be included as a modified Section 28(b) of the RUAA, as
it clarifies that the scope of review for orders appealed in arbitration is the same
as orders appealed in other civil actions under section 904.1.
VII. TITLE 9.1 - ARBITRATION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Section 1295 (Title 9.1 of the Arbitration Code) was specifically added to
the arbitration statute in 1975 "to alleviate the escalating cost of medical mal-
practice insurance premiums (and resulting problems of health care availability)
due to the surge of medical malpractice actions and high jury awards. '273 The
arbitration made under Section 2(b); (3) An order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(4) An order modifying or correcting an award; (5) An order vacating an award without directing a
rehearing; or (6) A judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions of this act." UAA § 19
(1956).
268. Those states include Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia,
and the District of Columbia.
269. Under RUAA § 28, an appeal may be heard from (I) an order denying the ability to arbi-
trate (2) granting a stay of an arbitration proceeding (3) confirming or denying an award (4) modifi-
cation or correction of an award (4) vacating an award (5) or a final judgment.
270. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1294; UAA § 9 ; RUAA § 28.
271. See, e.g., Merrick v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., 181 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534-35
(1982).
272. Section 906 limits the subject matter that is reviewable by the courts, and section 904.1
outlines the types of court judgments and orders that are reviewable. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§
904.1,906.
273. Rosenfield v. Sup. CL, 191 Cal. Rptr. 611, 612-614 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (Section 1295
"enacted in an extraordinary session of the Legislature called by the Governor to alleviate the esca-
lating cost of medical malpractice insurance premiums (and resulting problems of health care avail-
ability) due to the surge of medical malpractice actions and high jury awards.")
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basic function of Section 1295 is to establish criteria for uniform language and
conspicuous appearance of an arbitration provisions contained in medical ser-
vice contracts.274 The result of Section 1295 is to bind patients to arbitration
provisions that could otherwise be challenged as adhesion contracts. 275  Since
1975, California courts have upheld arbitration agreements drafted consistent
with Section 1295, generally finding that the public policy of encouraging arbi-
tration justifies the enforcement of arbitration provisions that comply with the
statute. 276 As a result, Section 1295 serves a determinative function - if the
arbitration provision contained in a medical service contract complies with Sec-
tion 1295, then the provision itself cannot be challenged. However, a patient's
knowledge of and consent to arbitration are not assumed, and a challenge to the
arbitration provision for lack of consent can made even if the provision meets
the standards of Section 1295.277
Recommendation: Section 1295 should be retained unmodified. Section
1295 was adopted to meet a specific legislative objective to "facilitate arbitra-
tion of medical malpractice disputes. 2 78 There is no evidence to indicate that
this provision has not furthered that legislative objective. In the absence of an
apparent overriding policy that justifies amendment of this provision, section
1295 should remain unchanged.
VIII. TITLE 9.2 - PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT ARBITRATION
Section 1296 (Title 9.2) was added to the California arbitration statute in
1979 to provide an exemption to the default rule that arbitration awards cannot
be vacated for errors of law or fact. It does so by allowing parties to a public
construction contract to change the standard of review for arbitration awards. 7 9
Such heightened review must be specified in the contract; parties cannot rely on
Title 9.2 unless they have expressed an intent to allow the court to vacate an
award if it "is not supported by substantial evidence or that is based on an error
274. County of Contra Costa v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628, 634 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996) ("The purpose of that statute is to encourage and facilitate the arbitration of medical
malpractice claims by specifying uniform language to be used in binding arbitration agreements, so
that the patient knows what he or she is signing and knows its ramifications.")
275. Coon v. Nicola, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 851 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
276. Pietrelli v. Peacock, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 688, 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (the purpose of Sec-
tion 1295 "was to encourage and facilitate arbitration of medical malpractice disputes.")
277. Coon, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 851.
278. Pietrelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689.
279. Crowell v. Downey Cmty. Hosp. Found., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 815-16. (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
of law."' 0 However, California courts have interpreted this provision very nar-
rowly. As recently as 2002, the courts have applied the default rule, holding that
Title 9.2 does not extend beyond public construction contracts. 281
Thus, Section 1296 achieves two important results. It permits contractual
agreements for heightened judicial review of public construction contracts and it
expresses a legislative intent to preclude heightened judicial review in all other
contexts.
It should be noted the topic of contractual agreements for heightened judi-
cial scrutiny is a matter of intense public debate.282 Those who favor heightened
judicial scrutiny believe it affords a safety net that will encourage parties who
fear a wrongly decided award to take comfort in judicial scrutiny. This option
will increase recourse to arbitration. Those who oppose heightened judicial
scrutiny suggest that parties unwilling to accept the risk of binding awards be-
cause of an inherent mistrust of the process and arbitrators should contract for
non-binding procedures, forego arbitration entirely, and rely instead on tradi-
tional litigation.
As noted above, the drafters of the RUAA debated at length a proposal to
add a provision permitting heightened judicial scrutiny as a basis for vacating an
award under section 23 of the RUAA. In the end, the drafters determined that
the law was in a state of flux and decided not to include a statutory sanction of
expanded judicial review, leaving the parties "free to agree to contractual provi-
sions for judicial review of challenged awards . . . until the courts finally deter-
mine the propriety of such clauses.
28 3
Section 1296 largely settles the debate as to the propriety of heightened ju-
dicial scrutiny under the California Arbitration Act. 2 4 "The Legislature specifi-
cally authorized the parties to agree to a review of the merits of a construction
contract arbitration. No such review is authorized for other forms of arbitration
280. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sup. Ct, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 304-05. (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
281. Crowell, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 815-16.
282. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs, Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003); LaPine
Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera, 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997); UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp.,
148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998); Gateway Techs, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th
Cir. 1995); Dick v. Dick, 534 N.W.2d 185, 191 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Chicago, Southshore and
South Bend R.R. v. N. Indiana Commuter Transportation Dist., 682 N.E.2d 156, 159 (IlI. App. 3d
1997), rev'd on other grounds, 184 Ill. 151 (1998); NAB Constr. Corp. v. Metro.Transp. Auth., 579
N.Y.S.2d 375 (1992); Eric van Genkel, Reframing the Dilemma of Contractually Expanded Judicial
Review: Arbitral Appeal v. Vacatur, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 157 (2003); Scott Rau, Contracting
Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. OF INT'L ARB. 225 (1997); Stephen J. Ware, "Opt-In" for
Judicial Review of Errors of Law under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. OF INT'L
ARB. 263 (1997).
283. RUAA § 23, cmt. B (5).
284. However it does not settle the issue for arbitration agreements in California governed by
the FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT.
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in the Act. This suggests the legislative intent that parties cannot agree to a
review on the merits.
' 285
Recommendation: Section 1296 should be retained unmodified. It has been
interpreted to reflect a decision of the Legislature to limit heightened judicial
scrutiny to a very narrow context of public construction contracts. Although
other jurisdictions have upheld contractual attempts for heightened judicial scru-
tiny, the RUAA refused to sanction a statutory provision authorizing its use and
there appears to be insufficient support at this time to justify a statutory change
to California law.
IX. TITLE 9.3 - INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Section 1297 (Title 9.3)286 was adopted in 1988 to make California a more
attractive venue for international arbitration.287 It is unclear whether this objec-
tive has been realized. Judicial opinions applying and interpreting Section 1297
are extremely rare.288 Most international arbitration proceedings conducted in
California are governed by the Federal Arbitration Act,289 which in most con-
texts preempts the state statute to the extent there is any inconsistency between
the two laws. However, given the skeletal nature of the Federal Arbitration Act,
there will be situations in which provisions of both statutes are relevant.
Section 1297 is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration ("Model Law").2 ° California remains one of the few
states that has adopted the Model Law as part of its state arbitration statute.29'
Only seven states have based their statutes on the UNCITRAL Model Law.
"Other States have approached international arbitration in a variety of ways,
such as adopting parts of the UNCITRAL Model Law together with provisions
taken directly from the [New York Convention] or by devising their own inter-
285. Crowell, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 815-16.
286. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1297.
287. Albert S. Golbert & Daniel M. Kolkey, California's New International Arbitration and
Conciliation Code: California is a More Attractive Venue for Resolving International Commercial
Disputes, Los ANGELES LAW., November 1988, at 46.
288. Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642. (2001);
see also CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1297, Notes and Decisions (West 1982, Supp. 2003).
289. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
290. 24 I.L.M. 1302 (1985); Golbert & Kolkey, supra note 287, at 46. For a tabular section-
by-section analysis of the California statute's conformity with the Model Law, see Peter Binder,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN UNCITRAL MODEL LAW JURISDICTIONS, 241-313
(2000).
29 1. Coe, supra note 18 at 88.
national arbitration provisions. 292 The RUAA does not address international
arbitration as a specific subject of revision of the Uniform Arbitration Act.
Section 1297 is quite flexible and leaves many of the procedures to the dis-
cretion of the parties and the arbitrators. 293 However, Section 1297 varies from
the Model Law in four significant ways. In each case, it attempts to solve ambi-
guity within the Model Law, or to make international commercial arbitration in
California more attractive than it is under the Model Law.
First, the default number of arbitrators under the Model Law is three,2 4 but
under Section 1297 it is one.295 Given the significant costs associated with hav-
ing three arbitrators and the desire to avoid any possible conflict with the
FAA,296 the choice of one arbitrator as a default rule is salutary.
Second, Section 1297 and the Model Law vary in how interim measures are
used. The Model Law merely states that, notwithstanding an arbitration agree-
ment, a party may request and a court may grant an interim measure.2 97 On the
other hand, Section 1297 provides a mechanism for a court to enforce interim
measures awarded by the arbitral tribunal,298 and requires such court enforce-
ment subject to public policy considerations.299
Third, Section 1297 and the Model Law differ in regards to arbitrator im-
munity. Unlike the Model Law, Section 1297.119 provides an arbitrator with
"the immunity of a judicial officer from civil liability."3" This affords interna-
tional arbitrators more protection than domestic arbitrators, who enjoyed immu-
nity under the now repealed section 1280.1 of the California Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. As noted above, Section 14 of the RUAA includes a provision for arbi-
trator immunity, which was based on Section 1280.1.
Fourth, the Model Law and Section 1297 have different provisions for arbi-
trator disclosure. Under the Model Law, arbitrators must disclose "any circum-
stances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independ-
ence." '' Section 1297.121 requires that "all persons whose names have been
submitted for consideration shall... make a disclosure to the parties of any in-
formation which might cause their impartiality to be questioned. 30 2 It then
292. RUAA, supra note 3, Prefatory Note.
293. Golbert & Kolkey, supra note 287, at 47.
294. UNICTRAL MODEL LAW art. 10(2).
295. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297. 101.
296. 9 U.S.C. § 5 ("[U]nless otherwise provided in the agreement the arbitration shall be by a
single arbitrator.").
297. Model Law, art. 9 ("It is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to
request, before or during arbitral proceedings, from a court an interim measure of protection and for
a court to grant such measure.").
298. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1297.92-1297.93.
299. Id. at § 1297.94.
300. CAL. CODECIV. PROC. § 1297.119.
301. Model Law, art. 12(1).
302. Title 9.3 § 1297.121.
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enumerates categories of information that require disclosure that might question
the arbitrator's impartiality. 30 3 These disclosures are mandatory and cannot be
waived by contract.3°4 The enumerated criteria heighten the disclosure standard
as compared to the international or domestic norm.305 As discussed above, Cali-
fornia's utilization of strict mandatory criteria for arbitrator disclosure is highly
unusual and undermines California as a friendly venue for international arbitra-
tion.
Recommendation: Section 1297 should be retained with two modifications.
First, assuming Section 14 of the RUAA on arbitrator immunity is adopted as
recommended above, Section 1297.119 should be repealed to avoid any misin-
terpretation that might result in differential treatment between arbitrators in the
domestic and international contexts. If Section 14 of the RUAA is not adopted
as part of California law, Section 1297.119 should be retained without modifica-
tion.
Second, assuming Section 12 of the RUAA on arbitrator disclosures is
adopted as recommended above, then Section 1297.121-1297.125 should be
repealed. Otherwise, separate disclosure requirements will be mandated for
international and domestic arbitrations, creating confusion for arbitrators. If
Section 12 of the RUAA is not adopted, the change to the original Model Law
reflected in Section 1297.121, which is out of step with most other disclosure
requirements, should be repealed in favor of the original open-ended language of
Section 12(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
X. TITLE 9.3 - REAL ESTATE CONTRACT ARBITRATION
Section 1298 (Title 9.3)3" was added to the California Arbitration Statute in
1989 to regulate arbitration clauses contained in real estate contracts. 307 Section
303. Id. at § 1291.121(a)-(f).
304. Id. at§ 1291.122.
305. Compare INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, DRAFT REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP
ON GUIDELINES REGARDING THE STANDARD OF BIAS AND DISCLOSURE IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, § 6 (October 7, 2002); section 12 of the RUAA (requiring disclosure if
an arbitrator has a "financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding") with
Section 1297.12 1(d) (requiring disclosure if the arbitrator or his family has "financial interest in the
subject matter in controversy.").
306. Section 1298 should have been codified as Title 9.4, but officially is a second Title 9.3.
307. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1298; Villa Milano Homeowners Ass'n v. I1 Davorge, 102 Cal. Rptr.
2d 1, 8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) ("The obvious intent of these requirements is to call to the buyer's
attention the fact that he or she is being requested to agree to binding arbitration and to make certain
that he or she does so voluntarily, if at all.").
1298 regulates the size and font of real estate arbitration agreements, and it as-
sumes that agreements will be binding.3°8 However, the courts have not as-
sumed that arbitration agreements that comply with Section 1298 are valid.
First, unlike Section 1295(e) involving arbitration of medical malpractice
claims, Section 1298 contains no language to the effect that compliance with the
statutory requirements will render the contract "not a contract of adhesion, nor
unconscionable nor otherwise improper. ' '3°9 In at least one case, the court has
found real estate arbitration agreements to be unconscionable when they are
contained in a declaration of covenants, codes and restrictions, as opposed to
being part of the sale contract.310 Second, section 1298.7 incorporates a statu-
tory non-arbitrability provision for actions involving bodily injury, wrongful
death, or litigation for any construction or design defect.31" ' This is subject to
preemption by the FAA in the event the contract involves interstate com-
merce.
312
Recommendation: Section 1298 through 1298.8 should be repealed. Unlike
other provisions of the California Arbitration Act, these provisions do not pro-
mote arbitration and actually appear hostile to arbitration. They impose addi-
tional statutory obligations as to language and form with no countervailing as-
surances that compliance therewith will render the clause enforceable. In the
absence of these provisions, such contracts, like other contracts, will continue to
enjoy common law protection against adhesion and contract that are uncon-
scionable or otherwise improper. Moreover, it establishes a category of claims
pertaining to real estate claims that are not capable of settlement by arbitration.
This will promote parallel proceedings, with certain causes of action subject to
arbitration while others subject to litigation. And given the inconsistency of
Section 1298.7 with federal law, it also invites litigation on a case-by-case basis
as to whether California law is preempted because the contract involves inter-
state commerce. Finally, the policies that animate Section 1298 through 1298.8
appear inconsistent with the policies that support Section 1295. One would
308. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1298.
309. Compare CAL. CODE CIv. PROc. § 1295(e) with CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1298.
310. Villa Milano, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 8 ("by placing the arbitration provision in the [cove-
nants, codes and restrictions], which contain no notice provision and are not signed by the buyer, the
developer avoids informing the buyer that he or she is waiving the right to ajury trial. We can hardly
condone this mechanism for circumventing the protections of a statute.).
311. See § 1298.7 ("In the event an arbitration provision is included in a contract or agreement
covered by this title, it shall not preclude or limit any right of action for bodily injury or wrongful
death, or any right of action to which Section 337.1 or 337.15 is applicable."); Villa Milano, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 8 (Section 1298.7 "'shall not preclude or limit any right of action to which Section 337.1
or 337.15 is applicable.' Code of Civil Procedure sections 337.1 and 337.15 pertain to litigation to
recover damages for construction and design defects.").
312. Basura v. US Home Corp., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328, 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) ("These un-
controverted facts in the record compel the conclusion that the instant agreements between Home
and plaintiffs involved interstate commerce. Therefore, the agreements are governed by the FAA.").
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expect that, as with the medical profession, the escalating cost of insurance pre-
miums are significant in the real estate industry as well, and that promoting arbi-
tration is one means to address that concern.
XI. TITLE 9.5 - FIREFIGHTER AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ARBITRATION
Section 1299 was adopted to protect the health and welfare of the public by
providing impasse remedies necessary to afford public employers the opportu-
nity to safely alleviate the effects of labor strife.313 In an effort to meet its goal,
Section 1299 provides specific procedures on how to settle employment agree-
ments involving firefighters and police officers. It contains provisions regarding
the submission of a dispute to arbitration,3"4 the nature of arbitration proceed-
ings,"' the validity and enforcement of arbitration decisions, 3 and the modifi-
cation of an arbitral award.317
In April 2003, the California Supreme Court declared Section 1299 uncon-
stitutional. 3 8 Article XI of the State Constitution provides that "a county's
'governing body shall provide for the ... compensation ... of employees"' and
"forbids the Legislature to 'delegate to a private person or body power to ...
perform municipal functions. '319 The Court concluded that Section 1299 "vio-
lates both constitutional provisions. It deprives the county of its authority to
provide for the compensation of its employees."32'
Recommendation: Section 1299 in its current version is unconstitutional
and not enforceable. It should be repealed.
313. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1299
314. Id. at § 1299.4.
315. Id. at § 1299.5.
316. Id. at § 1299.6.
317. Id. at § 1299.7.
318. Riverside v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713 (2003).
319. Id. at 717.
320. Id.

